Blitzkrieg365
Registered User
Anyone else read this article? I'm glad Holtby is calling them out, that was a pathetic effort last night.
Anyone else read this article? I'm glad Holtby is calling them out, that was a pathetic effort last night.
If you program the subconscious to accept reasons for failure then it will look for ways to do so.
What he did was not leadership, its toxic.
I hope he's ready see just how toxic it was once he loses them a game.
21. Three years ago, there was a notable Washington/Toronto game at Air Canada Centre where Randy Carlyle put a man on Alexander Ovechkin during a Capitals’ power play, essentially turning a five-on-four to a four-on-three — daring anyone other than Ovechkin to beat him. It wasn’t as noticeable last Saturday, but Mike Babcock changed the Maple Leafs’ kill, especially for the Capitals. Generally, he prefers to play aggressively shorthanded, but this time Toronto sat back, lined up at the blue line and looked for Ovechkin once Washington entered. Quite simply, Babcock made the adjustment so Nicklas Backstrom would not have the puck when the Capitals entered the zone.
The beauty of this entry for the Caps is that by having Johansson most often as the puck carrier, the puck enters the zone on the right half-wall or goal-line, exactly where the Caps want it once they're in formation; it's only one or two short passes to get the puck over to Ovechkin or Oshie for their dangerous one-timers. By creating an environment (speed, decoy, polished product) in which Johansson (or Jason Chimera, or Kuznetsov, etc.) can enter the zone on his off-wing, this entry also means the player can easily drop the puck back to the point off the boards once in the zone or rush in for an off-wing (better angle) rush chance, but also is already in the intended position for the 1-3-1. In other words, a lot of teams have players enter the zone on the strong side, and then it takes 10-15 seconds for players to get into position on their off-wings (the Tampa Bay Lightning are an example of this), but not the Caps. Every second is accounted for, and very few are wasted.
There are a number of different ways one can evaluate the success of a zone entry, and I will cover at least four of them in my zone entry studies in the next few weeks. The method I've decided to use here is that a successful zone entry is one in which the team as a result of the entry gets off at least one dangerous rush shot (shot within five seconds of the entry and below the top of the faceoff circles) or gets into formation before the puck is cleared. Because so much of Caps' PP offense comes from those two states, I felt it was most appropriate. For reference, on the left are the entry rates for each of the six teams I track using that method.
The Caps are clearly the best, with the Toronto Maple Leafs not too far behind. The New York Islanders are a team that, especially in the first half of the year, treated the power play not too differently from even strength -- not electing for a distinct formation at all times -- and as a result their numbers are likely skewed negatively by this method of evaluation. So looking at micro-stats, how does each aspect of the Capitals' entry scheme, particularly the Single Swing, contribute to that success rate?