I am still waiting for you to respond to my points on this, but have had about a week of silence. But to
you again, to which I expect no response . . . again . . . Baseball proves just the opposite . . .
2000:
The highest spender The NY Hogs, spent $95,285,187, the lowest spenders, The Twins, spent $16,723,347, or 5.7 times as much.
2001:
The highest spender The NY Hogs, spent $114,457,768, the lowest spenders, The Twins, spent $27,411,912, or 4.18 times as much.
2002:
The highest spender The NY Hogs, spent $138,423,649, the lowest spenders, The Tampa Bay, spent $35,882,301, or 3.86 times as much.
2003:
The highest spender The NY Hogs, spent $169,588,508, the lowest spenders, The Tampa Bay, spent $27,434,258, or 6.18 times as much.
2004:
The highest spender The NY Hogs, spent $187,918,394, the lowest spenders, The Tampa Bay, spent $24,427,167, or 7.7 times as much.
In 2005 the hogs are projected to spend considerably over $200 million. How has a luxury tax slowed them in the least?
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/20....comparison.ap/
Final ps:
A study done that fairly conclusively shows the disparity set forth above adversly and quantifiably leads to massive competitive imbalance. So it definately does matter and undermines the credibility of a sport.
http://www.economicsbulletin.uiuc.edu/2003/volume1/EB-03A10003A.pdf
Now some quotes from George Will commenting on the blue ribbon panel he along with Paul Volker, a couple of others chaired to 'fix' baseball's problems. The points made still have relevence as the fixes of the 2002 CBA are proving to be no fixes at all, as shown above, the same disparities exist and divergence between spending is even more pronounced. None of the recommendations of the blue ribbon panel assembled before that 2002 new CBA were implimented. Some points made:
The union believes that unconstrained spending by the richest three teams pulls up all payrolls. Most owners believe that baseball's problems--competitive imbalance, the parlous financial conditions of many clubs--result from large and growing disparities of what are mistakenly treated as ``local'' revenues.
These disparities largely reflect differences in teams' broadcasting revenues. The Yankees' broadcasting revenues ($62 million) are more than those of seven other teams (Kansas City, Minnesota, Oakland, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Florida, Milwaukee) (BEG ITAL)combined.
The owners' initial proposal included two recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics (George Mitchell, Paul Volcker, Yale's President Richard Levin and this columnist). One is increased revenue sharing (from 20 percent to 50 percent of so-called ``local revenues''). The other, to slow payroll growth, is a 50 percent tax on the portion of any team's payroll in excess of $98 million. Neither recommendation involves a new or radical concept. Baseball has revenue sharing now. It had a luxury tax from 1997 through 1999.
The union's initial proposal was to increase revenue sharing only to 22.5 percent, and (BEG ITAL)no tax. The union likes the status quo. But this is the status quo:
Of the 224 postseason games since the 1994 strike, 219 have been won by teams in the top two payroll quartiles. All World Series games since the strike have been won by teams in the top quartile. In 1991, 13 of the other 25 teams had payrolls at least 75 percent as large as the Yankees' payroll (which was smaller than Oakland's). Today, only four of the other 29 do. When the Yankees play the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, which they do 19 times this season, there is a $97 million payroll disparity ($135 million to $38 million). One day this May the Mets fielded a $63 million starting lineup against a $4 million Padres lineup.
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/georgewill/gw20020810.shtml