I have read considerably on this, have you? After all you are the one who said Crosby could sue but have still not come up with the grounds or the damages he would sue for.Tom_Benjamin said:When did they change the US Labour law or the US antitrust law to make this an accurate statement? Are you making this stuff up or do you actually understand how labour and antitrust law applies to sports leagues? Want to explain your position in the context of the antitrust law and the dozen or so cases decided by the courts?
I was not being sarcastic when I said the NHL was not the employer. Each player works for an individual team. These teams are competing businesses. They cannot stick their heads together and make up the rules. It is against the law for competing businesses to fix prices. They can't fix the price of labour either.
Tom
Let's take your second point first: the NHL is not the employer. You may not have been sarcastic but you were wrong. This is what the NLRB act has to say:
"Associations: These are regarded as a single employer in that the annual business of all association members is totaled to determine whether any of the standards apply." Also, The Act does not cover certain idividuals including independent contractors (which may be what the NHL could try).
As for your first point, the following (taken from the NLRB website) is what I'm basing my opinions on. What are yours based on?
In its statutory assignment, the NLRB has two principal functions: (1) to determine, through secret-ballot elections, the free democratic choice by employees as to whether or not they wish to be represented by a union in dealing with their employers and, if so, by which union; and (2) to prevent and remedy unlawful acts, called unfair labor practices, by either employers or unions.
Unfair Labor Practice Cases
When an unfair labor practice charge is filed, the appropriate field office conducts an investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the Act has been violated. If the Regional Director finds reasonable cause to believe a violation of the law has been committed, the Region seeks a voluntary settlement to remedy the alleged violations. If these settlement efforts fail, a formal complaint is issued and the case goes to hearing before an NLRB administrative law judge. The judge issues a written decision, which may be appealed to the Board for a final Agency determination. That final determination is subject to review in the Federal courts. Only about 4 percent of the cases proceed to Board decision.
Section 8(a)(5) makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith about wages, hours, and other conditions of employment with the representative selected by a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining. A bargaining representative which seeks to enforce its right concerning an employer under this section must show that it has been designated by a majority of the employees, that the unit is appropriate, and that there has been both a demand that the employer bargain and a refusal by the employer to do so.
Required subjects of bargaining. The duty to bargain covers all matters concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. On "nonmandatory" subjects, the parties are free to bargain and to agree, but neither party may insist on bargaining on such subjects over the objection of the other party.
An employer will be found to have violated Section 8(a)(5) if its conduct in bargaining, viewed in its entirety, indicates that the employer did not negotiate with a good faith intention to reach agreement. However, the employer's good faith is not at issue when its conduct constitutes an out-and-out refusal to bargain on a mandatory subject.
The employer's duty to bargain includes the duty to supply information that is relevant and necessary to allow the employees' representative to bargain intelligently and effectively with respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.
The duty of an employer to bargain includes the duty to refrain from unilateral action, that is, taking action on its own with respect to matters concerning which it is required to bargain, and from making changes in terms and conditions of employment without consulting the employees' representative.
An employer who purchases or otherwise acquires the operations of another may be obligated to recognize and bargain with the union that represented the employees before the business was transferred. In general, these bargaining obligations exist--and the purchaser is termed a successor employer--when there is a substantial continuity in the employing enterprise despite the sale and transfer of the business. Whether the purchaser is a successor employer is dependent on several factors, including the number of employees taken over by the purchasing employer, the similarity in operations and product of the two employers, the manner in which the purchaser integrates the purchased operations into its other operations, and the character of the bargaining relationship and agreement between the union and the original employer.
The NLR Act is not a criminal statute. It is entirely remedial. It is intended to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices, not to punish the person responsible for them. The Board is authorized by Section 10(c) not only to issue a cease-and-desist order, but "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act."
The objective of the NLR Act to avoid or reduce industrial strife and protect the public health, safety, and interest, can best be achieved by the parties or those who may become parties to an individual dispute. Voluntary adjustment of differences at the community and local level is almost invariably the speediest, most satisfactory, and longest lasting way of carrying out the objective of the Act.