One thing I've been thinking about...
And isn't it true that he has no right to challenge the relocation process of the NHL based on anti-trust or otherwise until he is an actual owner?
.
My response would be Yes.
Under
NBA v. SDC, the NHL rules themeselves do not violate antitrust laws - but particular application of those rules in a specific instance can. Here, Balsilie does not own the team yet, so, the league will argue, he cannot make a proper application for a team he actually owns to relocate from Phoenix to Hamilton. The league will likely argue he does not have standing to make a request to relocate until he actually owns the team free and clear in Phoenix and then makes the application. Once the application is received, the league can then make a decision (as the NBA did in the SDC case cited below) and if the grounds for denial are "reasonable" will not violate the antitrust laws. The league, however, will argue that Balsilies attempt to make such a request and to even file the antitrust case challenging the league rules is completely premature and he lacks standing to do so having not satisfied the conditions precedent neeeded to make such a claim (i.e., actual ownership; filing an actual request to relocate a team he owns; denial of that request based on application of unreasonable factors.)
Ninth Circuit court of Appeals in
NBA v. SDC 815 F.2d 562, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1987) (the Clippers case) stated:
"
Since a careful analysis of Raiders I makes it clear that franchise movement restrictions are not invalid as a matter of law, for the district judge to grant summary judgment against the NBA, he must have found that the NBA had adduced no facts upon which a reasonable jury could have found that NBA consideration of the Clippers' move was a reasonable restraint of trade. As we have demonstrated, antitrust analysis under Raiders I indicates that the question of what restraints are reasonable is one of fact. We believe that numerous issues of fact remain.
[7] The NBA asserts a number of genuine issues of fact: (1) the purpose of the restraint as demonstrated by the NBA's use of a variety of criteria in evaluating franchise movement, (2) the market created by professional basketball, which the NBA alleges is substantially different from that of professional football, and (3) the actual effect the NBA's limitations on movements might have on trade. The NBA's assertions, if further documented at trial, create an entirely different factual setting than that of the Raiders and the NFL. Further, as the NBA correctly notes, the antitrust issue here is vastly different than that in the Raiders cases: the issue here is “whether the mere requirement that a team seek [NBA] Board of Governor approval before it seizes a new franchise location violates the Sherman Act.†The NBA here did not attempt to forbid the move. It scheduled the Clippers in the Sports Arena, and when faced with continued assertions of potential antitrust liability, brought this suit for declaratory relief. Given the Raiders I rejection of per se analysis for franchise movement rules of sports leagues, and the existence of genuine issues of fact regarding the reasonableness of the restraint, the judgment against the NBA must be reversed.
Similarly, the district court's grant of summary judgment for antitrust declaratory relief to the defendants ignores genuine issues of fact and misinterprets Raiders I,
and must be reversed. The district court granted the Clippers judgment on their Count I, which asserted that Article 9, Article 9A if effective, and any meeting of the NBA to consider the Clippers' move, all violate the antitrust laws.
Raiders II, however, reemphasized that only the particular application of the franchise movement rules in that case violated antitrust law. The mere existence of Article 9, Article 9A, and various provisions for franchise movement evaluation, cannot violate antitrust law. Further, the NBA has adduced sufficient facts to create a genuine issue of the reasonability of the restraint.
"