1979 Challenge Cup discussion thread

[Zine]

Not once in that video did I see any resemblance of a rifle, handgun or otherwise.......

2:54 Eagleson's taking quite the pounding from about half a dozen militiamen. Imagine this happening in Canada to Tretiak or Bykov or Bragin....

The video clearly shows 5-6 police, not beating up, but attempting to restrain a madman from rushing the ice/goal judge. What did Eagleson expect when he charged through a bunch of officers? Then again, he's a hot headed convicted felon.
The EXACT SAME THING would've happened in North America if some Soviet executive, in a fit of rage, stormed the goal judge and a police officer was standing nearby. Nothing wrong with taking precaution.

Like I've said, events like these are exaggerated and romanticized. It's a far cry from the paranoid "Canadian players saved Eagleson from a beating by 'mob' of heavily armed Red Army soldiers intent on taking him away to god knows where!"

 

[YMB29]

Plouffe is quoted in the documentary as saying the militia was armed, probably with handguns because you don't see any rifles at this point.

It said that he was escorted to the game by armed guards. Whether that is true or not we don't know, but at most it means that some of the militiamen were armed with pistols.

What Fisher says is that after the incident the doors at both ends opened and heavily armed soldiers filed in carrying machine guns to reinforce the militia that was already there, presumably as a show of force to counter what the Canadian players had done to the militia with their sticks in order to win Eagleson's release from their mugging.

What did the Canadian players do that would cause this? Kill someone? All they did was wave their sticks and try to grab Eagleson. The camera does not show the entire incident but it does not look like there was any fight. Probably the militia let go of Eagleson once they realized who he was.
The militiamen were on alert to prevent a riot by the Canadian fans and players, as one of your articles mentions.

Reid's account is consistent with Fisher's in this respect in that he referred to the existence of a ring of heavily armed soldiers with fixed bayonets at the time the Canadians were leaving the ice.

Machine guns vs. bayonets... Not consistent...

Since neither you nor I were there, but each of these four gentlemen were, I don't believe it matters what you or I think, but if you want to say all four of them are liars and just happened to make up a bunch of sh** independently of each other, go right ahead.

It is not about them being liars but mixing myths with facts while describing an event that was decades ago...

No, Fisher doesn't say that no time was devoted to the Eagleson incident, because clearly the movie spent a good amount of time on that. What Fisher says is that no time was devoted to the Soviet military response to the incident in the form of the arrival of troops carrying machine guns and that that was the most frightening moment of the series.

The movie does show soldiers with machine guns...

What the movie gets wrong is that it shows militiamen carrying machine guns at the time of the scrum with Eagleson. That wasn't accurate but likely resulted from a deliberate conflation by the writers of what happened before the incident with what happened after the incident.

Or deliberate conflation of myth and fact...

As to trying to draw a distinction between regular soldiers and militia,
I guarantee you would not be able to find a Canadian outside of the military who knew the difference between the uniform of a Soviet soldier and a Soviet militiaman; I for one certainly thought they were soldiers and so did the Canadians for that matter. Your attempted distinction is petty.

Just in case you still did not figure it out, militia = Soviet police.
So they are policemen/police officers/cops.
To try to distinguish the police from the army is petty?
Blue is not typically a color for a military uniform, well unless you are talking about the 19th century... Did you expect the Soviet police to look like the Canadian mounties?

The excerpt from the documentary is a deadly accurate historical record of the state of affairs prior to and during the Eagleson altercation. At 1:02, you see Soviet "soldiers", militia, police, whatever, standing shoulder to shoulder at ice level prior to the start of the game as the narrator recounts that Plouffe was "escorted by armed guards" and made to sit by himself "in a sea of militia" without cheering or attempting to contact other Canadian fans. (Like that would happen at a hockey game in Canada or in any other civilized country for that matter.)

Well the behavior of the Canadian players and fans called for such security. The Canadians did not exactly show themselves to be more civilized...

1:23 shows Eagleson negotiating with his Soviet counterpart over the sudden change in referee as the Czech ref agreed on had mysteriously contracted food poisoning so Kompalla had to go back in… the militia are clearly in the background there as well.

2:42 militia behind goal judge

So what?

2:54 Eagleson's taking quite the pounding from about half a dozen militiamen. Imagine this happening in Canada to Tretiak or Bykov or Bragin....

Well if they would do something stupid then I can imagine that.
And two or three policemen restraining is not "taking a pounding"...

Seeing is believing, my friend... and the camera doesn't lie.

Did I say it was lying? It does not lie, well except the one used for the movie...

Militia, army, whatever. See above. And no, I obviously didn't mean 1000 militia surrounded Eagleson, that's a ludicrous interpretation.

That is what you said exactly.

I was referring to the number of militia in the rink, some of whom were giving Eagleson quite the mugging.

Again not exactly a mugging.
He was yelling like an idiot and running to the goal judge. Did you expect them to just stand there?

Sure, my recounting of eyewitness accounts is "paranoid" and what the camera filmed was nothing but a "Cold War stereotype". I guess the camera's paranoid too.

No just your interpretations of what it shows.

 

[Yakushev72]

I was neither "jumping to conclusions" or "assuming". I cite the following excerpts from a contemporary academic paper from 1988 published in the Journal of Sports History on the subject of the close tie-in between CSKA in particular and the national team, and the policy underlying the concentration of virtually all of the Soviet Union's hockey talent in CSKA and the so-called "Moscow triumvirate" that provided "designated competition" for CSKA:

"There can be little dispute that the success of the Soviet National Team depended directly on the development of TsSKA, which Tarasov guided to eighteen USSR championships from 1948 to 1975. [fn. After Tarasov’s final retirement, TsSKA endured a second-place finish in 1976 but has claimed every championship since.]

Over the years, TsSKA has consistently laid claim to a disproportionate share of the nation’s outstanding players, not infrequently by arranging the transfers of gifted performers from within the training systems of other clubs. Until recently, no formal rules governed player assignments and TsSKA shrewdly employed the lure of its vast resources and the leverage afforded by the system of universal military service to strengthen itself dramatically. Equally important, there has been apparent recognition on the part of the USSR Hockey Federation that the concentration of talent on one or several clubs in the Elite League (vysshaia liga) serves the interests of Soviet hockey, or at least some of those interests. By maintaining combinations of crucial players on a few clubs, the federation insures that the national team will benefit from the fluidity and cohesiveness possible only when players have performed together for a long time. In other words, trios of forwards and pairs of defensemen can be sent to the national team intact, thus providing the Soviets with a meaningful edge over other (chiefly Western) countries whose players remain largely dispersed during their domestic seasons.

One unfortunate result of this practice has been a severe imbalance among teams in the Elite League. The recurring inability of other clubs to challenge TsSKA in recent years and to a lesser degree the domination of league play by the Moscow triumvirate of TsSKA, Dinamo and Spartak, has often been noted by Soviet specialists. A Leningrad hockey guide published at the start of the 1979-80 season contained blunt commentary on the problem.

Nevertheless, the concentration of young, talented players on one or two leading teams continues. The leaders of Soviet hockey justify this in the interests of of the national team, and the better preparation of its reserve. [fn. ince Viktor Tikhonov assumed the helm of TsSKA and the national team in 1977, a number of outstanding players have joined the Moscow army club after making their debuts with other teams including the league’s top scorer, Sergei Makarov, who left Traktor Cheliabinsk in 1978, and the brilliant Igor Larionov, who came from Khimik Voskresensk in 1981. In fact, in recent years TsSKA has recruited so many young players from Cheliabinsk that it is sometimes called “TsSKA-Traktor". As this fact suggests, one need not be an active member of the armed forces to enroll.

Thus year after year Soviet hockey authorities have been left to explain the absence of a strong competitive environment in their premier league. In 1979, Arkadii Chernyshev, himself a former coach of the national team, argued in favor of the system employed in Soviet soccer in which star players remain on the rosters of their original clubs but spend considerable time as part of the national team as well. After the 1983-84 campaign, in which TsSKA left all rivals far behind while losing only one game in forty-four, Spartak and Dinamo, in particular, were singled out for public criticism. Even Tikhonov, who has yet to lose a league championship at TsSKA, complained, “They were obliged to compete with TsSKA, and for this they had to employ maximum commitment and discipline." Anatolii Kostriukov, Administrative Director of the USSR Hockey Federation, expressed similar disapproval after the 1982-83 season, charging that Spartak had failed to fulfill its potential and that Dinamo had disappointed for the second straight year. Yet another commentator, S. Kruzhkov, asserted in Soverskii sport in 1983 that although TsSKA always had outstanding players, during some years Spartak, Dinamo Moscow, and the Wings of the Soviets (Moscow) were endowed with comparable talent. Repeated references to the failure of Spartak and Dinamo to press TsSKA for hockey leadership tacitly confirmed their role as “designated challengers†in the Elite League, that is clubs stocked with enough talent to place them on approximately the same competitive level as the Central Army Sports Club. Soviet hockey specialists have frequently stressed the need for intense competition in the Elite League to stimulate superior performance and tactical innovation. However, development of the national team still heads the list of federation priorities.

[T]he unceasing dominance of TsSKA has brought redeeming advantages. Members of the triumphant army team have served the state well as propagandists. All recent squad members have joined the Komsomol (the Communist Youth League) and Tretiak, in particular, emerged as a visible spokesman for the organization. In his 1977 book on hockey, Tretiak wrote that before the third game of the series against the World Hockey Association All- Stars in Winnipeg, the squad held a Komsomol meeting at which they listened to stirring patriotic talks by Vladimir Petrov, the team’s Komsomol organizer, and Boris Mikhailov, team captain.

For the Party, TsSKA serves as a pillar of the official values of the state. TsSKA athletes, with a few exceptions, are icons of victory at home and abroad, championing the virtues of collectivism and selfless devotion to the socialist motherland. Fittingly, in 1983, TsSKA opened a new museum on its Moscow premises filled with historical memorabilia extolling heroes and triumphs of the near and distant past. The “Club of Champions,†as TsSKA is known among is supporters, reigns supreme in the minds, if not the hearts of most Muscovites. And, however much the success of the club in domestic competition-especially hockey-may be resented, all Soviet fans bask in the glory TsSKA athletes gain in international play."

http://www.la84foundation.org/SportsLibrary/JSH/JSH1988/JSH1502/jsh1502d.pdf

What difference does it make in international tournaments whether a national team player comes from one club team or 30 club teams? I don't see how having players on one team affects the outcome of an international match between two national teams. The reason why CSKA was able to attract many of the best players from around the country is that players could satisfy their military obligation by playing for the Army team. Players like Fetisov and Makarov had a military rank while they played for CSKA, so its not as if it was an involuntary thing! But the point is, you keep saying that it is this huge advantage that many of the best players from the Soviet Union played for CSKA, but isn't it true that a national team can pick players from any source available? As long as they're Soviet or Russian nationals, they can play for the national team, right? Just like Canada can get Canadian players from the NHL, junior leagues, Europe, or wherever they want to play for Team Canada, as long as they qualify as Canadians. I don't understand what the argument is about.

 

[hammerwielder]

The militia that was on duty during Game 8 according to YMB29:

The militia that actually was on duty at Luzhniki during Game 8:

The militia's pre-game warm-up outside Luzhniki:

The militia for Game 8 as seen by Patrick Reid:

... and by Red Fisher:

The militia that the Canadians wish had been on duty for Game 8:

The militia that I would have most liked to surrender to had I been able to attend Game 8:

 

[hammerwielder]

What difference does it make in international tournaments whether a national team player comes from one club team or 30 club teams? I don't see how having players on one team affects the outcome of an international match between two national teams. The reason why CSKA was able to attract many of the best players from around the country is that players could satisfy their military obligation by playing for the Army team. Players like Fetisov and Makarov had a military rank while they played for CSKA, so its not as if it was an involuntary thing! But the point is, you keep saying that it is this huge advantage that many of the best players from the Soviet Union played for CSKA, but isn't it true that a national team can pick players from any source available? As long as they're Soviet or Russian nationals, they can play for the national team, right? Just like Canada can get Canadian players from the NHL, junior leagues, Europe, or wherever they want to play for Team Canada, as long as they qualify as Canadians. I don't understand what the argument is about.

Familiarity, systems, cohesiveness, synergies.

I remember when the NHL All-Star game consisted of the Stanley Cup champion playing a team of all-stars chosen from the other five teams back in the days of the original six. More often than not the all-stars would lose because, though their team had the better and more talented players, the team they faced was much better as a team.

Fast forward to the post-Soviet era for team Russia. The talent of the individual players is at least equal to that possessed by the players on the Soviet national side, but as a team they suffer from the same affliction of unfamiliarity as do other national teams today, composed of all-stars that do not play together on a regular basis. This is what set apart the Soviet national team from any other: the luxury of having a domestic league geared entirely toward the success of the national side, where least a dozen of its players played together year-round on both the top club team and the national team, and the other players were dispersed as forward lines or defence units or both with two or three other teams that served as designated competitors for the top team.

The synergies from such an approach were obvious in the form of the magical record the national team maintained in international play (and that the top club team achieved in league play, going virtually undefeated by other Soviet club teams during entire seasons and winning 16 league titles in a row -- try that in the modern NHL).

One of the only modern examples of the type of synergy that can only be developed over a career spent playing together is the Sedin twins. They have that same other-worldly ability to anticipate each others' moves that makes the pairing much greater than the sum of its individual parts. I would not say that either twin on its own is among the best Swedish players of all time, on the level of a Forsberg or Sundin or Lidstrom, but as a unit they are devastating. And they also know they are much stronger as that unit than as individuals, as do the teams for which they have played: they stick together not so much out of brotherly love but for the much higher value they individually command as a result of their synergies, a synergistic value that has been recognized by all of the organizations for which they have played.

Now take that modern example of a synergistic unit of two players and multiply it by 2.5, and you describe every one of the better five-man units on the Soviet national team. I believe this makes the point very clearly.

 

[YMB29]

The militia that was on duty during Game 8 according to YMB29:

The militia that actually was on duty at Luzhniki during Game 8:

The militia's pre-game warm-up outside Luzhniki:

The militia for Game 8 as seen by Patrick Reid:

... and by Red Fisher:

The militia that the Canadians wish had been on duty for Game 8:

The militia that I would have most liked to surrender to had I been able to attend Game 8:

So you go from myth to fantasy...

The militia that the Canadians wish had been on duty for Game 8:

I don't see anything. Did you mean to post this:

I remember when the NHL All-Star game consisted of the Stanley Cup champion playing a team of all-stars chosen from the other five teams back in the days of the original six. More often than not the all-stars would lose because, though their team had the better and more talented players, the team they faced was much better as a team.

Well that was long ago.

Fast forward to the post-Soviet era for team Russia. The talent of the individual players is at least equal to that possessed by the players on the Soviet national side

Offensively maybe but defensively...

as a team they suffer from the same affliction of unfamiliarity as do other national teams today, composed of all-stars that do not play together on a regular basis. This is what set apart the Soviet national team from any other: the luxury of having a domestic league geared entirely toward the success of the national side, where least a dozen of its players played together year-round on both the top club team and the national team, and the other players were dispersed as forward lines or defence units or both with two or three other teams that served as designated competitors for the top team.

Again you are trying to simplify things and repeating the old Canadian argument that the Soviets were only good because they played together year round.

Now take that modern example of a synergistic unit of two players and multiply it by 2.5, and you describe every one of the better five-man units on the Soviet national team. I believe this makes the point very clearly.

And how many set five men units did the Soviet team have?

 

[hammerwielder]

So you go from myth to fantasy...

Sense of humour, hello.

The pic was there yesterday but not today... weird, I'll re-post it.

Trust me, it wouldn't have been the RCMP! If you have been reading the news in Canada lately, they would probably be more likely to kill you than the Soviet militia any day.

Offensively maybe but defensively...

I don't know, +45 for Ovechkin, +26, 36, 41, 34 for Datsyuk, +25, 36 for Semin, +37 for Volchenkov, Fedorov etc, all indicate outstanding defensive capability. Another generalization not based on facts. If anything the Soviets' biggest vulnerability was on defence. A 4 goal-per-game average in the 72 series was bad and the 6 goal a game average in the 87 Canada Cup final was even worse. There were more high scoring than low scoring games in best on best competition Soviet Union-Canada. The Soviets lost the Summit Series on two glaring defensive gaffes by Vasiliev: a poor clearing attempt right to Cournoyer, and then a botched no-look pass right to Esposito that led directly to Henderson's goal. He also tripped Henderson on the Cournoyer shot and then left his man. And that goal happened only because of not one but two big fat rebounds given up by Tretiak. And no one covered Henderson. All through that series I believed that if Canada was going to win, it would be by exploiting the Soviets' weak team defence; and they did.

Again you are trying to simplify things and repeating the old Canadian argument that the Soviets were only good because they played together year round.

If you actually bothered to read my posts instead of mouthing the party line and doing a disservice to my views you would know already my high level of respect for the Soviet national team and in particular my view that they were perhaps the greatest hockey team ever, particularly during the glory years between 1977 and 1983.

And how many set five men units did the Soviet team have?

Granted, the five-man unit was more of a Tikhonov innovation whereas the crucial unit in the Tarasov-Bobrov era was the troika. That's still a lot more than a pair of Sedins. And the defensive pairings were inviolable.

Now you're going to say the Soviet line combinations weren't completely set and there were variations. I know that. But the concept of troika was set and the role of each player within it was precisely orchestrated and defined. And the forward lines were indeed largely set subject only to certain defined exceptions or v2 combinations that are also well known. There was never wholesale line juggling.

 

[Yakushev72]

Yakushev 72

Familiarity, systems, cohesiveness, synergies.

I remember when the NHL All-Star game consisted of the Stanley Cup champion playing a team of all-stars chosen from the other five teams back in the days of the original six. More often than not the all-stars would lose because, though their team had the better and more talented players, the team they faced was much better as a team.

Fast forward to the post-Soviet era for team Russia. The talent of the individual players is at least equal to that possessed by the players on the Soviet national side, but as a team they suffer from the same affliction of unfamiliarity as do other national teams today, composed of all-stars that do not play together on a regular basis. This is what set apart the Soviet national team from any other: the luxury of having a domestic league geared entirely toward the success of the national side, where least a dozen of its players played together year-round on both the top club team and the national team, and the other players were dispersed as forward lines or defence units or both with two or three other teams that served as designated competitors for the top team.

The synergies from such an approach were obvious in the form of the magical record the national team maintained in international play (and that the top club team achieved in league play, going virtually undefeated by other Soviet club teams during entire seasons and winning 16 league titles in a row -- try that in the modern NHL).

One of the only modern examples of the type of synergy that can only be developed over a career spent playing together is the Sedin twins. They have that same other-worldly ability to anticipate each others' moves that makes the pairing much greater than the sum of its individual parts. I would not say that either twin on its own is among the best Swedish players of all time, on the level of a Forsberg or Sundin or Lidstrom, but as a unit they are devastating. And they also know they are much stronger as that unit than as individuals, as do the teams for which they have played: they stick together not so much out of brotherly love but for the much higher value they individually command as a result of their synergies, a synergistic value that has been recognized by all of the organizations for which they have played.

Now take that modern example of a synergistic unit of two players and multiply it by 2.5, and you describe every one of the better five-man units on the Soviet national team. I believe this makes the point very clearly.

We disagree on this, but I think you vastly overestimate the value of having two lines and two sets of defensemen from the same club team representing the national team. there were times when Canadian teams had NHL lines intact as well. Its all about playing hockey, and which team puts the puck in the net most. If Canada had better hockey players, wouldn't they have consistently overcome synergy?

 

[hammerwielder]

We disagree on this, but I think you vastly overestimate the value of having two lines and two sets of defensemen from the same club team representing the national team. there were times when Canadian teams had NHL lines intact as well. Its all about playing hockey, and which team puts the puck in the net most. If Canada had better hockey players, wouldn't they have consistently overcome synergy?

Well, the record shows that the best on best Canadian teams did just that on the majority of occasions, unless you subscribe to the view that somehow the Canadian victories were tainted by the excuses cited frequently by some here of biased refereeing, smaller ice surface, etc. Certainly the Soviet team itself never resorted to such excuses after its losses in 1972, 1976, 1984, 1987 and 1991, nor did Canadian teams after their 1979 and 1981 losses, when the Soviet national team was probably at its all-time peak. In 1979 and 1981 the Soviet team had both synergy and an extraordinarily deep roster, whereas on the other occasions the synergy of the Soviet team almost always made it the more coherent unit and forced the Canadian team to win either through the individual skill of its most elite players, as in 1987, or through emotion, grit, and some players having had the ability to elevate their game, as in 1972 and 1984. The Canadian team of 1976 was probably the most unbeatable unit I have ever seen, but still that was a factor of superior talent more than cohesiveness or synergy, which every Soviet team displayed.

I don't believe a team could play the type of puck possession game the Soviets played without those types of synergies, for example.

 

[Anderson9]

What difference does it make in in-ternational tournaments whether a national team player comes from one club team or 30 club teams? I don't see how having players on one team affects the outcome of an international match between two national teams.

To this, let me provide an excerpt from a book by Victor Tikhonov, "Hopes, Disappointments and Dreams" (action takes place in 1977, following the Soviet's embarrassment at the WHC, ideological connotations undeniably obvious)

Итак, собрание было созвано и слово предоставили новому тренеру.
Говорил немного. О том, что считал важным. Говорил, что передо мною задача не просто дальнейшего усиления ЦСКА, ведущей нашей команды, но прежде всего такого усиления команды, которое позволило бы решить главную задачу – восстановление высокого авторитета советского хоккея. А роль хоккеистов ЦСКА в этом, естественно, преувеличивать невозможно<…>

– Меня, – доказывал я убежденно, с излишней, может быть, горячностью, – перевели сюда не только для того, чтобы ЦСКА в двадцать первый раз стал чемпионом страны. Это, конечно, как нетрудно понять, весьма важно для меня, для тренера, который тоже мечтает об успехе. Но еще важнее – именно потому и направили меня сюда, – чтобы сборная страны прервала серию поражений на чемпионатах мира.
<...>
Команда ЦСКА, имея неоспоримое преимущество по многим компонентам игры, по подбору игроков, дважды уступает первое место. Сначала «Спартаку», а через год-«Крыльям Советов». Почему? В игре ЦСКА в целом и ведущих хок-кеистов тех лет в частности четко просматривается тенденция – действовать так, чтобы сохранить преимущество, добытое в первом периоде. Если же соперник «раскроется», пытаясь сравнять счет, отыграться, то можно «наказать» его, используя стремительные контратаки, благо в мастерстве армейцы заметно превосходили соперников.
Лидеры команды не играли матч в полную силу с начала и до конца. Не игра-ли они с максимальной отдачей и весь сезон, нарушая тем самым лучшие тра-диции своего клуба.
Появилась вредная, с моей точки зрения, философия (кстати, ее поддерживали и некоторые журналисты, не критически, очевидно, прислушивающиеся к тренерам), суть которой заключалась в том, что лидеры устают, что их надо поберечь, что талантам требуется особый, индивидуальный режим.
Я вспоминал уже, как были освобождены от участия в первом Кубке Канады ведущие игроки сборной.<…>

(my first ever shot at translating a big text)

And finally, they convened a team meeting, and I had the floor. I didn’t speak much. I only mentioned what I thought most important. I said that I was faced with the mission of not just reinforcing CSKA, the league’s top team, but ultimately restoring the prestige of Soviet hockey. It stands to reason that team CskA plays the chief role [in fulfilling the task]

“I have been transferred here, I said, maybe with a bit extra vehemence , "to make sure CSKA is the national champion for a twenty-first time. Needless to say, it is important to me as a coach. But what’s more important, I am here to stop the national team’s losing streak at World championships”.

<…>CSKA, well above the rest of the league in most aspects of play as well as roster-wise, loses two championships, first to Sovietwings and two years later to Spartak Moscow. Why? I can trace a tendency in both Team CSKA and some top hockey players [of other teams] to play to protect, having built the first-period lead. If the other team opens out in an attempt to tie the score, CSKA has skills enough to add more scores on the breakaway, which they often did.
The team’s top players failed to play to potential all season long. They would slack down in midseason, too, contrary to the club’s traditions.
There developed a malign philosophy, backed up by some uncritical hockey writers, that boiled down to the fact that leaders tire and require an exclusive practicing regimen.
I already mentioned how the National Team’s top players were excused from participation in the first Canada Cup.

(I’m now working up to the punch line)

Создалось ложное, неверное в своей сути впечатление, что во всесоюзном чемпионате возросла конкуренция, что на звание первой команды претендуют несколько клубов.
А дело было в ином. Исчез общепризнанный лидер хоккея.

This gave the fallacious and intrinsically wrong impression of increased competition in the [Soviet] league, [an illusion] that the title was contested by a good few teams.

That was a wrong idea. Actually, [Soviet] hockey lost its acknowledged leader.

unquote

This actually killed the domestic national championship. The hockey machine gathered speed, so what a chance did the NHL stand at 1979 CC? Not a snowball's chance in hell! Against a country poised to extend Marxism all over the world.



PS As a postscript to those who follow soccer as well. In the same way, most successes of the Soviet soccer NT were due to a backbone team, Dynamo Kiev. In sharp contrast the untainted legends of the 70s, Ajax Amsterdam and Bayern Munich, these Soviet teams were artificial mammoth structures, feeding off smaller teams on direct orders from the authorities (obssessed with the idea of extending Soviet domination to football as well), providing the player core for the NT. THe whole concept of the core team wasn't born in Russia but the functionaries who were paranoid on finding proof of superiority of communism over capitalism jumped in to adopt the good trend. Effectively proved short-lived in both 1974-76 and 1986/88.

 

[Mr Kanadensisk]

Wow, when I started this thread I had no idea it would carry on for so long. I get a kick of how in a country the size of the USSR that they concentrated their entire national team in two or three club teams all playing in the same city. I'm sure the national team members never practiced together.

The Soviet National teams were great teams, but on a player by player basis the Soviets were never anywhere close to Canada. The Soviet teams always had tonnes of experience practicing and playing together which obviously gave them a huge advantage in international competitions.

The Soviets made a huge contribution to the game, but to say at any point as a hockey nation they were equal or better than Canada is completely ridiculous.

 

[Anderson9]

Wow, when I started this thread I had no idea it would carry on for so long. I get a kick of how in a country the size of the USSR that they concentrated their entire national team in two or three club teams all playing in the same city. I'm sure the national team members never practiced together.

The Soviet National teams were great teams, but on a player by player basis the Soviets were never anywhere close to Canada. The Soviet teams always had tonnes of experience practicing and playing together which obviously gave them a huge advantage in international competitions.

The Soviets made a huge contribution to the game, but to say at any point as a hockey nation they were equal or better than Canada is completely ridiculous.

The Soviets were technically immaculate. Credit where the credit is due. But, I can't for the life of me imagine a haphazard makeshift PP unit on any team in the world moving the puck as deftly as the Russians' Larionov line on this video,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpNWPefulhQ

 

[YMB29]

I don't know, +45 for Ovechkin, +26, 36, 41, 34 for Datsyuk, +25, 36 for Semin, +37 for Volchenkov, Fedorov etc, all indicate outstanding defensive capability. Another generalization not based on facts.

And using the plus/minus stat to check how good someone is defensively is not a generalization and a misuse of facts?
Also, obviously I am not talking about players like Fedorov or Datsyuk...

If anything the Soviets' biggest vulnerability was on defence. A 4 goal-per-game average in the 72 series was bad and the 6 goal a game average in the 87 Canada Cup final was even worse. There were more high scoring than low scoring games in best on best competition Soviet Union-Canada. The Soviets lost the Summit Series on two glaring defensive gaffes by Vasiliev: a poor clearing attempt right to Cournoyer, and then a botched no-look pass right to Esposito that led directly to Henderson's goal. He also tripped Henderson on the Cournoyer shot and then left his man. And that goal happened only because of not one but two big fat rebounds given up by Tretiak. And no one covered Henderson. All through that series I believed that if Canada was going to win, it would be by exploiting the Soviets' weak team defence; and they did.

Why are you using only the 72 series to judge how good the Soviets were defensively?
Canada was not exactly great at defense either in that series...

If you actually bothered to read my posts instead of mouthing the party line and doing a disservice to my views you would know already my high level of respect for the Soviet national team and in particular my view that they were perhaps the greatest hockey team ever, particularly during the glory years between 1977 and 1983.

Well you still say the same things as to why they were so good.

Granted, the five-man unit was more of a Tikhonov innovation whereas the crucial unit in the Tarasov-Bobrov era was the troika.

Besides the one obvious five men unit what others existed and played constantly with each other?

Now you're going to say the Soviet line combinations weren't completely set and there were variations. I know that. But the concept of troika was set and the role of each player within it was precisely orchestrated and defined.

That is close to what I am trying to say, that they had a defined system and players who could play within it, and for the system to be effective it did not necessarily require that each line or defensive pairing had to play together for a long time. A player could replace another on a line/troika and the level of play would not suffer, as long as the replacing player knew what is required of him.

And the forward lines were indeed largely set subject only to certain defined exceptions or v2 combinations that are also well known. There was never wholesale line juggling.

Well constant line juggling did not make sense for the Soviet system, and I am not sure it makes sense in the NHL... However they still had to often change lines and form new ones, like during the Challenge Cup as was mentioned before.

Well, the record shows that the best on best Canadian teams did just that on the majority of occasions, unless you subscribe to the view that somehow the Canadian victories were tainted by the excuses cited frequently by some here of biased refereeing, smaller ice surface, etc.

You understand yourself that this mattered, especially when the games were so close, but you just don't want to admit it.

Certainly the Soviet team itself never resorted to such excuses after its losses in 1972, 1976, 1984, 1987 and 1991, nor did Canadian teams after their 1979 and 1981 losses

The constant complaints of Soviets having more playing and training time are not excuses?
The Soviet players and Tikhonov often mention the ridiculous officiating in the Canada Cups.

the synergy of the Soviet team almost always made it the more coherent unit and forced the Canadian team to win either through the individual skill of its most elite players, as in 1987, or through emotion, grit, and some players having had the ability to elevate their game, as in 1972 and 1984.

Again that is just the official Canadian view that is repeated over and over.

(I’m now working up to the punch line)...

This gave the fallacious and intrinsically wrong impression of increased competition in the [Soviet] league, [an illusion] that the title was contested by a good few teams.

That was a wrong idea. Actually, [Soviet] hockey lost its acknowledged leader.

So what are you trying to say with this?
He is saying that CSKA was underperforming with the talent the team had and he was brought in to change this.

This actually killed the domestic national championship. The hockey machine gathered speed, so what a chance did the NHL stand at 1979 CC? Not a snowball's chance in hell!

Poor NHL...
So they killed the domestic championship and this somehow got the hockey machine going?

Against a country poised to extend Marxism all over the world.

Yes the Soviets were actually planning an invasion of North America to follow up on their victory in 1979...

In sharp contrast the untainted legends of the 70s, Ajax Amsterdam and Bayern Munich, these Soviet teams were artificial mammoth structures, feeding off smaller teams

That was/is common in European soccer, not just in the USSR.

THe whole concept of the core team wasn't born in Russia but the functionaries who were paranoid on finding proof of superiority of communism over capitalism jumped in to adopt the good trend.

You are really paranoid...

Wow, when I started this thread I had no idea it would carry on for so long. I get a kick of how in a country the size of the USSR that they concentrated their entire national team in two or three club teams all playing in the same city. I'm sure the national team members never practiced together.

Yes all the Moscow players lived in a collective barracks...

The Soviet National teams were great teams, but on a player by player basis the Soviets were never anywhere close to Canada. The Soviet teams always had tonnes of experience practicing and playing together which obviously gave them a huge advantage in international competitions.

I guess every Canadian fan has to make that excuse in every post about the USSR and sound like a broken record.
So Soviet players did not come close... As evidenced by Canadian players being constantly beaten one on one...

The Soviets made a huge contribution to the game, but to say at any point as a hockey nation they were equal or better than Canada is completely ridiculous.

And you constantly start these threads just to say that to yourself...

 

[Mr Kanadensisk]

The reason this thread will never end is that for one side all they have is the past. When the present and future look bleak to admit defeat in the past would be to realize that you have nothing.

 

[canuck2010]

The Soviets were technically immaculate. Credit where the credit is due. But, I can't for the life of me imagine a haphazard makeshift PP unit on any team in the world moving the puck as deftly as the Russians' Larionov line on this video,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpNWPefulhQ

I count 10 players on that team that played in the 82-83 championship for the Soviet Union plus the national team coach. I don't count one player who would of played for Team Canada on the players. What's your point.

 

[hammerwielder]

The Soviets were technically immaculate. Credit where the credit is due. But, I can't for the life of me imagine a haphazard makeshift PP unit on any team in the world moving the puck as deftly as the Russians' Larionov line on this video,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpNWPefulhQ

I don't get it either.

Kapustin lost the opening faceoff, and only a bad clearing attempt by the Flyers gets it back for them at the blueline. Soviets are kept on the perimeter, Kasatonov's point shot is blocked in front, the rebound goes right to Kapustin in the right slot who shoots wide, Lindbergh holds. Off the faceoff Kasatonov's point shot is wide, the rebound goes to Kapustin again, passes back to Kasatonov, over to Fetisov, whose point shot is wide right, rebound to Kasatonov at the point, over to Fetisov, cross-seam pass down to Kapustin (same set play later in the PP results in the goal), he's checked and his cross ice pass is intercepted by a Flyer. Soviet forwards start a change, then another bad clearing attempt by the Flyer player is intercepted easily by Fetisov, who promptly puts himself offside under checking pressure at the blueline while waiting for new linemates.

Larionov loses the ensuing faceoff and the puck is sent down the ice from the Flyers blueline. Kasatonov retrieves and passes off to Fetisov in the Soviet corner under forechecking pressure. Fetisov carries up ice slowly and tries to dish off to Kasatonov at the Flyers blueline but Kasatonov is checked and the puck floats out to centre. After regaining the puck Kasatonov skates back to the Soviet blueline to regroup. He passes to 28, who dishes back to Kasatonov near the Flyers blueline, to Krutov just inside the blueline, who turns it over again. The Flyer player to whom the puck floats gloves the puck to a teammate who is being interfered with by Krutov, no call, and 28 picks up the loose puck and shovels it back to Kasatonov at the blue line. Kasatonov backhands it under pressure to no one in particular and the puck is picked up by a Flyer in front of the net. Once again the clearing attempt is weak and the Flyer player who initially receives the puck inside the Flyer blueline is stick-checked by Fetisov onside and the puck rolls back into the zone where Larionov gets his stick on it and nudges it over to Krutov on the right wing. At this point the Flyer penalty killers are dog tired, having failed in three easy opportunities to clear the puck, and start running around in the defensive zone. Krutov passes to Larionov at the point who passes back to Krutov on the sideboard who tries the relay back but it isn't accurate and the puck is taken by Kasatonov who swings it over to Fetisov at the left point. The PK is now gassed and completely out of position. Fetisov fakes a shot and then goes back to Kasatonov, who fakes a shot and instead passes to Larionov who he spots in front of the collapsed Flyers box, who tips over to Krutov at the right dot who spots a cross-seam lane back to Fetisov. Krutov runs a pick play on the Flyers defenseman, no call, while Larionov cruises in behind unmarked and Fetisov relays it across the still-vacant diagonal seam to Larionov who scores on the only SOG of the power play by the Soviets with less than 20 seconds left on the PP. It's a very scrambly final sequence featuring a tired PK unit that is just running around.

One of the great contributions by the Soviet style to the game was modern power play strategy, and consequently the type of positioning and passing on this particular power play could now be executed by any good power play unit today in the NHL and even by a good junior team. The Flyers missed a bundle of opportunities to clear the puck and get a second PK unit on the ice and that enabled the Soviets (and would enable almost any other competent team now in a similar situation) to pass the puck around almost at will in the dying seconds of the PP.

 

[hammerwielder]

The Soviet National teams were great teams, but on a player by player basis the Soviets were never anywhere close to Canada. The Soviet teams always had tonnes of experience practicing and playing together which obviously gave them a huge advantage in international competitions.

The Soviets made a huge contribution to the game, but to say at any point as a hockey nation they were equal or better than Canada is completely ridiculous.

I'm afraid I can't agree with this assessment. From my observations, the Soviets' best players were as good as our best players except for Hull and Orr in the early 70s, Lafleur in the late 70s and Gretzky and Lemieux in the 80s. In 1972, Kharlamov and Yakushev were as good as any Canadian forwards. By 1978, the Soviets not only had the Mikhailov-Petrov-Kharlamov line but also outstanding younger forwards such as Makarov, Kapustin and the great Latvian Helmut Balderis. By 1981, there was the legendary Green Unit along with the Kapustin-Shepelev-Shalimov line that tore Canada up in the final, plus Maltsev and one of the best defence rosters in history. In the last gasp of CCCP, the Soviets had the likes of Mogilny (defected in '89, scored 76 goals as a 23-year-old), Bure ('defected' in '90, 4-time 60 goal scorer, 437 goals in 702 NHL games, 9 goals in 6 games at '98 Olympics) and Fedorov (defected '91, 50 goal scorer, 535 NHL goals).

The Soviets combined their outstanding team play with equal talent levels from the late 70s to early 80s and were consequently the better team during those years. Far from being a ridiculous statement, I believe this conclusion is backed up by lopsided 6-0 and 8-1 wins over the Canadian national side in final games in the 1979 and 1981 tournaments and the regular trouncing of admittedly less talented Canadian sides at the WC.

 

[Zine]

The Soviet National teams were great teams, but on a player by player basis the Soviets were never anywhere close to Canada. The Soviet teams always had tonnes of experience practicing and playing together which obviously gave them a huge advantage in international competitions.

The Soviets made a huge contribution to the game, but to say at any point as a hockey nation they were equal or better than Canada is completely ridiculous.

If 'tons of practice and playing experience' was the key to Soviet success, how can you explain Soviet success at the junior level.....even against other European teams? Soviet junior teams were comprised of players from numerous squads and never practiced remotely close to the levels of senior team.

If what you say is valid, Soviet junior team would have experienced much less success relative to the senior team because it wouldn't have had said 'advantage'.........however this was never the case.

 

[hammerwielder]

Why are you using only the 72 series to judge how good the Soviets were defensively?
Canada was not exactly great at defense either in that series...

I didn't; I used 1972 and 1987, but let's go further, shall we? The Soviets allowed 4 goals in each of the first two games of the Challenge Cup, 7 goals in the round-robin game of the 1981 Canada Cup, 8 overall in two games, and 6 goals in the two games played in the 1984 Canada Cup plus the 3 goals in the one 1976 game. A 4.70 GAA overall in best on best competition is terrible.

Canada's proficiency on defence has nothing to do with your comment; you responded to my contention that Russia's players of today are as good as the Soviet players of yesterday by saying "offensively, maybe, but [not] defensively" and my answer was directed to your comment. So raising Canada's record in response to my comment has no logic.

If you do want to talk about Canada's defensive record as a separate matter, Dryden was terrible (.838 save percentage) and Esposito only a bit better (.882) in goal for Canada in '72, Cheevers (.667) was way past it as a "money" goalie by '79, and for the 1981 final two rarely-spoken words suffice: "Mike" "Liut" (.867). In 1987 Fuhr played well but still had a save percentage below .900. Another factor of course was the offensive firepower of the Soviet teams. The goaltending couldn't really be faulted in 1987 for Canada at least because the final series was like three all-star games offensively but with no holds barred. But decent goaltending would have reduced the GAA for Canada in the other series for sure.

Well you still say the same things as to why they were so good.

No I don't. I have talked about their high skill and talent level time and again.

You understand yourself that this mattered, especially when the games were so close, but you just don't want to admit it.

No, it didn't. Canada won the Summit Series only by having won 3 out of the 4 games that were played on the big ice, in hostile territory and with ridiculously incompetent referees, and outplaying the Soviets in the 4th game. After the 1987 Canada Cup final, Tikhonov said it was the most "perfect" hockey he had ever witnessed, the likes of which would not likely be seen again. He didn't make any of the excuses that you are seeking to do now for the Soviet defeat. If anything, Canada had a distinct speed advantage with Gretzky, Lemieux, Coffey, Murphy etc. and could have done even better on the big surface. Canada has won the WC, WJC and U18 many times on big ice. I am so sick and tired of hearing this lame argument as an excuse for Soviet losses.

The Soviet players and Tikhonov often mention the ridiculous officiating in the Canada Cups.

Please provide references for your claim.

Again that is just the official Canadian view that is repeated over and over.

No, the opinions I express are solely my own and are not influenced by anything a Canadian or for that matter a Russian says.

 

[VMBM]

I don't get it either.

Kapustin lost the opening faceoff, and only a bad clearing attempt by the Flyers gets it back for them at the blueline. Soviets are kept on the perimeter, Kasatonov's point shot is blocked in front, the rebound goes right to Kapustin in the right slot who shoots wide, Lindbergh holds. Off the faceoff Kasatonov's point shot is wide, the rebound goes to Kapustin again, passes back to Kasatonov, over to Fetisov, whose point shot is wide right, rebound to Kasatonov at the point, over to Fetisov, cross-seam pass down to Kapustin (same set play later in the PP results in the goal), he's checked and his cross ice pass is intercepted by a Flyer. Soviet forwards start a change, then another bad clearing attempt by the Flyer player is intercepted easily by Fetisov, who promptly puts himself offside under checking pressure at the blueline while waiting for new linemates.

Larionov loses the ensuing faceoff and the puck is sent down the ice from the Flyers blueline. Kasatonov retrieves and passes off to Fetisov in the Soviet corner under forechecking pressure. Fetisov carries up ice slowly and tries to dish off to Kasatonov at the Flyers blueline but Kasatonov is checked and the puck floats out to centre. After regaining the puck Kasatonov skates back to the Soviet blueline to regroup. He passes to 28, who dishes back to Kasatonov near the Flyers blueline, to Krutov just inside the blueline, who turns it over again. The Flyer player to whom the puck floats gloves the puck to a teammate who is being interfered with by Krutov, no call, and 28 picks up the loose puck and shovels it back to Kasatonov at the blue line. Kasatonov backhands it under pressure to no one in particular and the puck is picked up by a Flyer in front of the net. Once again the clearing attempt is weak and the Flyer player who initially receives the puck inside the Flyer blueline is stick-checked by Fetisov onside and the puck rolls back into the zone where Larionov gets his stick on it and nudges it over to Krutov on the right wing. At this point the Flyer penalty killers are dog tired, having failed in three easy opportunities to clear the puck, and start running around in the defensive zone. Krutov passes to Larionov at the point who passes back to Krutov on the sideboard who tries the relay back but it isn't accurate and the puck is taken by Kasatonov who swings it over to Fetisov at the left point. The PK is now gassed and completely out of position. Fetisov fakes a shot and then goes back to Kasatonov, who fakes a shot and instead passes to Larionov who he spots in front of the collapsed Flyers box, who tips over to Krutov at the right dot who spots a cross-seam lane back to Fetisov. Krutov runs a pick play on the Flyers defenseman, no call, while Larionov cruises in behind unmarked and Fetisov relays it across the still-vacant diagonal seam to Larionov who scores on the only SOG of the power play by the Soviets with less than 20 seconds left on the PP. It's a very scrambly final sequence featuring a tired PK unit that is just running around.

One of the great contributions by the Soviet style to the game was modern power play strategy, and consequently the type of positioning and passing on this particular power play could now be executed by any good power play unit today in the NHL and even by a good junior team. The Flyers missed a bundle of opportunities to clear the puck and get a second PK unit on the ice and that enabled the Soviets (and would enable almost any other competent team now in a similar situation) to pass the puck around almost at will in the dying seconds of the PP.

The 'devastating Soviet PP' (or so it is often remembered) was sometimes great, sometimes terrible. 1972 it was mostly good, in the 1974 WHA series and 1975-76 Super Series it was mostly terrible, and in the Challenge Cup it was very good. Seems to me that, at least in the mid-Seventies, they were quite vulnerable to aggressive penalty killing, and they just wouldn't dump & chase and fight for the puck, even when that would have been sometimes preferable. Then again, they could look awful for 1 min 55 seconds, and then score at the last moment.

In the 80s (from what I've seen) it was generally better, and especially the defensemen seemed to know a lot better what to do. In the 1984 CC semi-final, though, the Canadian penalty killing was very good & agressive, and the Soviet power play went mostly nowhere, though they scored 1 PP goal in the game. I wouldn't say the Soviet PP was "devastating" in the 1987 Canada Cup, either.

 

[VMBM]

I didn't; I used 1972 and 1987, but let's go further, shall we? The Soviets allowed 4 goals in each of the first two games of the Challenge Cup, 7 goals in the round-robin game of the 1981 Canada Cup, 8 overall in two games, and 6 goals in the two games played in the 1984 Canada Cup plus the 3 goals in the one 1976 game. A 4.70 GAA overall in best on best competition is terrible.

Canada's proficiency on defence has nothing to do with your comment; you responded to my contention that Russia's players of today are as good as the Soviet players of yesterday by saying "offensively, maybe, but [not] defensively" and my answer was directed to your comment. So raising Canada's record in response to my comment has no logic.

If you do want to talk about Canada's defensive record as a separate matter, Dryden was terrible (.838 save percentage) and Esposito only a bit better (.882) in goal for Canada in '72, Cheevers (.667) was way past it as a "money" goalie by '79, and for the 1981 final two rarely-spoken words suffice: "Mike" "Liut" (.867). In 1987 Fuhr played well but still had a save percentage below .900. Another factor of course was the offensive firepower of the Soviet teams. The goaltending couldn't really be faulted in 1987 for Canada at least because the final series was like three all-star games offensively but with no holds barred. But decent goaltending would have reduced the GAA for Canada in the other series for sure.

Well, Tretiak's save percentage in the 1972 series was .884, and I would say that the Soviet attack was more varied then, even though the Canadians shot harder and were stronger in the slot (though I haven't really studied which team got more quality shots per game or anything like that). I don't think Tretiak fully deserves the praise he got for the 1972 series; he was very good in Canada, but quite mediocre in Moscow. Then again, he was only 20 years old (but a bit of a veteran already!). I do believe Canada had the better defense in that series, definitely.

And Tretiak was simply terrible in the 1979 Challenge Cup; 1st game (.833...), 2nd game (.75). Even the Tretiak fans Danny Gallivan and Dick Irvin, Jr. were turning against him ("not the Tretiak we've seen before"), and so he wasn't even used in the last game. Myshkin played well, and Cheevers let in a couple of softies in the last period, but NHL All-Stars had hardly any quality chances in the game; nearly all the shots were from bad angles etc; the Soviet defense definitely deserves credit in that game. With perfect goal-tending, maybe NHL would have lost only 2-0 or 3-0, but so what?

Fuhr clearly beat Mylnikov (1st and 3rd final) in 1987 and probably Belosheikin (2nd final) too.

 

[Mr Kanadensisk]

If 'tons of practice and playing experience' was the key to Soviet success, how can you explain Soviet success at the junior level.....even against other European teams? Soviet junior teams were comprised of players from numerous squads and never practiced remotely close to the levels of senior team.

If what you say is valid, Soviet junior team would have experienced much less success relative to the senior team because it wouldn't have had said 'advantage'.........however this was never the case.

By the very nature of the USSR the government had absolute control over all its players and clubs. Don't kid yourself if you don't think their junior squads also had way more prep time than any of the other countries (except possibly Czksvk). Why were so few quality pro players produced by those Soviet U20 teams?

 

[Mr Kanadensisk]

I'm afraid I can't agree with this assessment. From my observations, the Soviets' best players were as good as our best players except for Hull and Orr in the early 70s, Lafleur in the late 70s and Gretzky and Lemieux in the 80s. In 1972, Kharlamov and Yakushev were as good as any Canadian forwards. By 1978, the Soviets not only had the Mikhailov-Petrov-Kharlamov line but also outstanding younger forwards such as Makarov, Kapustin and the great Latvian Helmut Balderis. By 1981, there was the legendary Green Unit along with the Kapustin-Shepelev-Shalimov line that tore Canada up in the final, plus Maltsev and one of the best defence rosters in history. In the last gasp of CCCP, the Soviets had the likes of Mogilny (defected in '89, scored 76 goals as a 23-year-old), Bure ('defected' in '90, 4-time 60 goal scorer, 437 goals in 702 NHL games, 9 goals in 6 games at '98 Olympics) and Fedorov (defected '91, 50 goal scorer, 535 NHL goals).

The Soviets combined their outstanding team play with equal talent levels from the late 70s to early 80s and were consequently the better team during those years. Far from being a ridiculous statement, I believe this conclusion is backed up by lopsided 6-0 and 8-1 wins over the Canadian national side in final games in the 1979 and 1981 tournaments and the regular trouncing of admittedly less talented Canadian sides at the WC.

and after the wall fell and we had the NHL as a basis to compare all players the most Soviet trained players ever to finish in the top 30 scoring was 5. I never said the USSR didn't produce any great players, but rather very few great players in comparison to Canada.

 

[canuck2010]

I'm afraid I can't agree with this assessment. From my observations, the Soviets' best players were as good as our best players except for Hull and Orr in the early 70s, Lafleur in the late 70s and Gretzky and Lemieux in the 80s. In 1972, Kharlamov and Yakushev were as good as any Canadian forwards. By 1978, the Soviets not only had the Mikhailov-Petrov-Kharlamov line but also outstanding younger forwards such as Makarov, Kapustin and the great Latvian Helmut Balderis. By 1981, there was the legendary Green Unit along with the Kapustin-Shepelev-Shalimov line that tore Canada up in the final, plus Maltsev and one of the best defence rosters in history. In the last gasp of CCCP, the Soviets had the likes of Mogilny (defected in '89, scored 76 goals as a 23-year-old), Bure ('defected' in '90, 4-time 60 goal scorer, 437 goals in 702 NHL games, 9 goals in 6 games at '98 Olympics) and Fedorov (defected '91, 50 goal scorer, 535 NHL goals).

The Soviets combined their outstanding team play with equal talent levels from the late 70s to early 80s and were consequently the better team during those years. Far from being a ridiculous statement, I believe this conclusion is backed up by lopsided 6-0 and 8-1 wins over the Canadian national side in final games in the 1979 and 1981 tournaments and the regular trouncing of admittedly less talented Canadian sides at the WC.

What Canadian National side in 1979?

 

[YMB29]

The reason this thread will never end is that for one side all they have is the past. When the present and future look bleak to admit defeat in the past would be to realize that you have nothing.

So I ask again why do you keep on starting these threads if you are so secure?

I didn't; I used 1972 and 1987, but let's go further, shall we? The Soviets allowed 4 goals in each of the first two games of the Challenge Cup, 7 goals in the round-robin game of the 1981 Canada Cup, 8 overall in two games, and 6 goals in the two games played in the 1984 Canada Cup plus the 3 goals in the one 1976 game. A 4.70 GAA overall in best on best competition is terrible.

This is still a poor attempt to judge a team defensively...
What about goals for? You can take any good team of the 70's and 80's and point out the high GAA, relative to today.
Russian teams of the last 20 years are known for defensive collapses. Such defensive breakdowns were not common for Soviet teams, especially in important games. This is a fault of the Russian team system (or lack of one), but many of the players have not been defensively responsible also.

Canada's proficiency on defence has nothing to do with your comment; you responded to my contention that Russia's players of today are as good as the Soviet players of yesterday by saying "offensively, maybe, but [not] defensively" and my answer was directed to your comment. So raising Canada's record in response to my comment has no logic.

Well if you are going to analyze their play and bring up some stats to show that they were not so good defensively, the stats and play of their opponents also have to be taken into account.

No I don't. I have talked about their high skill and talent level time and again.

But you say that none of them were as good as Canada's elite players, and that them playing and training together was the most important factor in their success.

No, it didn't. Canada won the Summit Series only by having won 3 out of the 4 games that were played on the big ice, in hostile territory and with ridiculously incompetent referees, and outplaying the Soviets in the 4th game.

Incompetent from the Canadian view.

After the 1987 Canada Cup final, Tikhonov said it was the most "perfect" hockey he had ever witnessed, the likes of which would not likely be seen again. He didn't make any of the excuses that you are seeking to do now for the Soviet defeat.

Please provide references for your claim.

Viktor Tikhonov, coach of the Soviet national hockey team, said a major reason for losing the Canada Cup final earlier this month was "bias and errors in refereeing."

In an interview with the trade union newspaper Trud, Tikhonov was also critical of his own defensemen and goalies and promised a shakeup at those positions.

The Soviets lost to the Canadians, 6-5, in the third and deciding match of the fourth Canada Cup at Hamilton, Canada, last week. The previous two games were split by 6-5 scores, one in overtime and the other in two overtimes.

Mario Lemieux's 11th goal of the tournament with 1:26 left in the third period of the deciding game gave Canada the victory in a contest officiated by Canadian referee Dan Koharski and Soviet linesman Mikhail Galinovski.

Tikhonov did not mention Koharski by name.
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-09-24/sports/sp-10089_1

I can find more from Russian media interviews if you want.

If anything, Canada had a distinct speed advantage with Gretzky, Lemieux, Coffey, Murphy etc. and could have done even better on the big surface.

First time I hear that Canada had a speed advantage over the Soviets.

No, the opinions I express are solely my own and are not influenced by anything a Canadian or for that matter a Russian says.

And so that is why you sound like every biased Canadian fan, for the most part...

and after the wall fell and we had the NHL as a basis to compare all players the most Soviet trained players ever to finish in the top 30 scoring was 5. I never said the USSR didn't produce any great players, but rather very few great players in comparison to Canada.

Five out of how many Soviet trained players in the NHL?
Soviet players were not trained to play North American hockey, so it is not really an equal basis to compare players. What if Canadian players had to play in the Soviet league?