mrzeigler
.. but I'm not wrong
I didn't see this referenced on here from The Hockey Writers. Interesting read of waivers and the ever-discussed topic of asset management: Waivers, Sunk Costs, and the Pittsburgh Penguins.
It's a much, much, much better read than the story THW posted recently about the Malkin/Ovechkin rivalry.
Two of the more interesting parts, IMO:
and
It's a much, much, much better read than the story THW posted recently about the Malkin/Ovechkin rivalry.
Two of the more interesting parts, IMO:
Why was he able to trade Letestu, Lovejoy, and Tangradi, but not Johnson and Strait? Other than pure and simple talent, there are a few factors to consider:
Teams keep up-to-the-minute depth charts of the 29 other organizations around the league. They can anticipate when Shero is going to be in a roster pinch and will be forced to trade or waive a player.
If you’re an opposing GM and injuries leave you with a hole to fill, there’s more urgency to grab the Penguins castoff before other teams have a chance to. Maybe that means sending a low pick to Shero, but if you think the player will be waived and your team is first in waiver priority, you wait.
Waiting, however, comes with the risk that another GM is more desperate than you and will make the trade you weren’t willing to.
It’s essentially a poker game.
Shero tries to touch base with every GM at least once a month during the season. When these roster pinches occur, he has to convince other teams that it’s worth making a trade as opposed to waiting for waivers. He could always bluff directly to other GM’s, but risking credibility over fifth-round picks doesn’t lead to a long NHL management career.
It’s safer to do it indirectly. Maybe word leaks that “multiple teams†are interested in trading for a soon-to-be waived player. The key is to create demand and a market for a deal.
and
The Penguins invested heavily in his development, in addition to the world-class facilities provided to all players at the minor league level. Assistant coach Tony Granato, player development coach Bill Guerin, and other front office members worked with Tangradi one-on-one to try to mold him into an NHL player. The team pushed him into leadership positions in Wilkes-Barre (AHL) and had him mentoring younger players at the team’s summer prospect camps. The organization spent significant resources on the development of Lovejoy, Strait, Johnson, and Letestu as well.
Perhaps the team’s development process can be questioned for not turning Tangradi and others into permanent Penguins (although all are playing at the NHL level right now), but Shero’s willingness to unload these players for little or no return is actually good asset management.
Consider the concept of sunk costs:
A “sunk cost†is a cost that you have already incurred and that you cannot recover. People often have an irrational desire to use products for which they have paid a lot of money, or to continue following a plan that has required a great investment. They think that if they abandon the product or change their approach, they will be throwing money or time away. That’s not true – the money and time have already been thrown away. Continuing to use a bad product or to follow a bad plan is only increasing the amount being thrown away.
It doesn’t matter how much time or money the Penguins already spent on Tangradi’s development. It doesn’t matter that he was the promising prospect expected to convincingly tip the scales of the Whitney-Kunitz trade in Pittsburgh’s favor. It doesn’t matter that he scored only one goal in 45 NHL games, and it wouldn’t matter if he had scored 100 either.
Forget the sunk costs. All that matters to Shero is what Eric Tangradi can be reasonably expected to contribute to the Pittsburgh Penguins moving forward. Based on his comments, he decided that a low draft pick and the opportunity to give Bennett a look was worth more than any potential upside for Tangradi in Pittsburgh.
