Weber was not seeking a short term deal in the summer of 2011. He knew that the next CBA was probably going to have limits on contract terms. He knew he was an RFA until after the new CBA, so he needed to get his "max" deal done before the new CBA. He wanted a maximum deal and he felt the only way he could assure that he was getting the max was to go the offer sheet route (essentially thats the only way to see what the true "market" value for him was, because going offer sheet allowed him to negotiate as if he was a UFA)
Yes, Weber felt he could not get the deal he was seeking in Nashville.
Poile took him to arbitration to avoid that, even though he risked the possibility that Weber could choose a two year deal and we would be screwed. the only reason to take that risk is if you dont have the money to cover a big offer sheet.
Filing for arbitration is one thing as that doesn't prevent you from signing a contract. However, you do not
actually go through the arbitration process with your captain and/or a star. Choosing to do that can cause massive hurt feelings. Look at the situation with Colorado and ROR. This was a massive mistake on the part of Poile.
And it still seems to me that Weber hasn't forgotten it either.
Between the summer of 2011 and the summer of 2012, we added Brett Wilsons deep pockets, and I believe one of the owners sold their business and made a huge profit. So by summer of 2012, we not only had the money to cover a Weber offer sheet, we had the money to try to keep Suter and sign Parise. Weber still wanted to see what his full value was on the market, which is why he went the offer sheet route rather than just signing Poiles blank check, which was apparently offered.
so in summary, it WAS the owners who drove the decision to take Weber to arbitration in 2011. There is no other logical explanation.
Looking at Poile's history, and knowing his personality, taking Weber to arbitration seems to smack entirely of a David Poile decision. Poile is a good GM, but he displays some quirks/history pretty consistently.
He tends to stick to his belief of what a player's worth- to a fault. He tends to overvalue average talent and undervalue elite talent. He also clearly gets miffed at players and can take that public. He handled the situation with Weber as poorly as one could. The aftermath with Suter was poorly handled. The Spezza situation was poorly handled.
Consider these two situations:
Nashville's negotiations with Weber and Suter next to Chicago's re-signing of Toews and Kane.
Nashville was a team on the rise, but had never spent anywhere close to the cap. They couldn't/wouldn't lock up Suter and let him get all the way to UFA. They took their captain to arbitration after boasting that they could pay Weber "fair market value".
Chicago is a team with Cup wins, and still in their window. One year before Toews and Kane will reach UFA, they sign both to the highest AAV contracts in the league. They do that knowing that they might lose a talent they would prefer to keep like a Sharp or Seabrook.
Both teams very successful at the respective times, although one with actual skins on the wall. One team with a history of using every resource at their disposal to build their roster. When the time came to pay their stars, they raised the bar in terms of AAV at the earliest opportunity and avoided a year of will they/or won't they re-sign.
The other team having never spent to the cap, spouting promises on local radio stations, but not willing to make that same commitment until forced to do so.