The Soviet Hockey Program

Killion

Registered User
Feb 19, 2010
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^^^ Welcome to hf, and wow, thats quite the tome, quite the thesis. Much of it sourced in Russia, laying to rest a lot of myth & fiction. Very critical & sober over-view. Excellent. Ive only scanned it but certainly well worth taking the time to read.... Thanks for joining & linking that up here at History of Hockey.
 

Theokritos

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Apr 6, 2010
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Looks excellent. A few inaccuracies in the first few sections so far, but this still has to be one of the most important contributions on Soviet Hockey this forum has seen so far. Thanks a lot!
 

Theokritos

Global Moderator
Apr 6, 2010
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The thesis is an invaluable source of information. Some interesting excerpts:

Concentration of talent:

The principle means used by the Army team, and, to a lesser extent, by Dynamo, was the military draft. Not only did the TsSKA and Dynamo teams represent their respective parent organizations, the players, coaches and staff were also enlisted members or officers in either the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, or the KGB. As the Soviet Union practiced universal military service the simplest way to acquire a talented teenager was to draft him – literally. Once in the army, the youngster would serve out his two years not in Eastern Europe, or at a godforsaken outpost on the Chinese border, but rather on the ice. Once his two years were up, it was simple enough to sign him on to an officer's contract, and to keep him in the organization for the rest of his playing days. Recruiting players from other teams was also simple enough. Upon being discharged from the services, like all Soviet males, they were still enlisted in the reserves and could be recalled to active duty. (…)
So were the Army and the KGB the real architects of the centralization system that helped win the USSR glory abroad? The answer would appear to be no. (…) The centralizing system employed in hockey to such great effect was never implemented in football – or any other sport for that matter. Upon careful consideration we see that in building TsSKA and Dynamo dynasties in Moscow, the military was not the architect, but rather a tool. The true originators of this system were none other than the longstanding national team coaches, Colonels Anatoly Tarasov and Arkady Chernyshev. (...)
Centralization...was never a policy of the Soviet sports bureaucracy. Rather, it was executed by leading Moscow coaches, on their own initiative. (…) As early as 1957, the Hockey Section resolved to petition the Army to defer the draft of talented young players, and leave them on their original clubs... most members of the Hockey Section were genuinely concerned with the further development of mass hockey participation, and the improvement of elite hockey outside the capital. Many realized that although player concentration may have helped the Soviet national team in the short term, the national program suffered long term damage from this policy. With the most talented players, coaches and specialists constantly migrating towards Moscow, hockey development in all other areas of the country was severely Pejorative Slured... Ultimately, there was little the Sports Committee could do to stop the Army from drafting whom it chose to... The pillage of the provincial hockey clubs was made very clear by the fact that while the Moscow teams remained dominant in league play throughout the Soviet period, they lost their dominance at the junior level by the mid 1960's.

Material situation of the players:

The material starting point for all Soviet players was their salary, which was euphemistically referred to as a stipend. During the 1960's and 1970's a Soviet player on one of the nation's leading teams had an official salary that was two to three times the sum the average worker could expect to earn. Players on lower level teams could expect to earn a decent worker's salary... In addition to their official stipends, players for the Soviet national team were paid substantial bonuses for important international victories. Winning an Olympic gold, for example, brought the players an official bonus of one-thousand rubles (one year's wages for many workers). Winning league championships and a variety of minors championships also brought sizable cash bonuses... Players were also rewarded – or enticed – with a variety of generous gifts, which were provided by the club teams. For example, as a sort of signing bonus, junior prodigy Aleksandr Maltsev was given a car by Moscow Dynamo: “For the first time in my life I received a car. I didn't buy it – I received it. It was done this way: players who distinguished themselves were given a personal car.” …[Valery] Vasilev...recalls that after joining Dynamo, he was given a one-room apartment to himself, something totally inconceivable for [an] average twenty year old bachelor. And, after he established himself as a[n] international star, his position improved further: “Later on, I was presented with a luxury apartment by Yuri Vladimirov Andropov. Naturally, I didn't get [this] for having pretty eyes.” And, in addition to expensive gifts, leading coaches and players had access to hard currency stores and, presumably, hard currency to spend there. (...)
But the true riches were reserved for the players who where the elite of the elite: players good enough to play on the Moscow core teams, and make it onto either the first or second Soviet national team. This group of players and coaches were given free reign – within the limits of reason – to engage in lucrative black market trade... a trip abroad was almost always a chance to enhance one's material situation. The principle was simple: using souvenirs, caviar, vodka and other Soviet goods which were desirable in the West, the players would obtain consumer goods for resale in the USSR, or hard currency... Fortunately for the history of Soviet hockey, the Party was pragmatic enough to bend the rules in this instance and made no effort to punish what would otherwise be considered very serious violations of Soviet law. (...)

Scientific approach:

Every year, lengthy training and activity programs would be developed and approved, which were binding on a nation-wide scale. The first such reports appear in the archival record beginning in 1956. In addition to setting – or at least approving – training approaches in general terms the Hockey Section passed concrete targets for individual players, to guide their off-season training. For example, in 1957/58 players were expected to be able [to] sprint a distance of fifty meters in 5.8 seconds, and one-hundred meters in 11.9. (...)
In addition to target setting, the Hockey Section organized a seemingly endless succession of conferences and planning sessions, which focused on theoretical matters of training and tactics. A national education program for coaches of all levels was set up, with the hours to be spent on each subject carefully delineated, for the purpose of teaching correct approaches to training, technique and strategy. In addition to these conferences, the Hockey Section oversaw the production and distribution of a wealth of technical and educational literature on the sport. From the earliest days of Soviet hockey, committees of coaches were periodically convened to collaborate on books: first studies about hockey in Canada and in other countries, and then, as the Soviet program advanced, more inward looking studies. Finally, the Hockey Section maintained full academic programs dedicated to the study of ice-hockey at all the nation's leading physical culture institutions.

––––––––––––––––

Will post more the upcoming days.
 
Last edited:

Canadiens1958

Registered User
Nov 30, 2007
20,020
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Lake Memphremagog, QC.
Interesting

The thesis is an invaluable source of information. Some interesting excerpts:

Concentration of talent:

The principle means used by the Army team, and, to a lesser extent, by Dynamo, was the military draft. Not only did the TsSKA and Dynamo teams represent their respective parent organizations, the players, coaches and staff were also enlisted members or officers in either the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, or the KGB. As the Soviet Union practiced universal military service the simplest way to acquire a talented teenager was to draft him – literally. Once in the army, the youngster would serve out his two years not in Eastern Europe, or at a godforsaken outpost on the Chinese border, but rather on the ice. Once his two years were up, it was simple enough to sign him on to an officer's contract, and to keep him in the organization for the rest of his playing days. Recruiting players from other teams was also simple enough. Upon being discharged from the services, like all Soviet males, they were still enlisted in the reserves and could be recalled to active duty. (…)
So were the Army and the KGB the real architects of the centralization system that helped win the USSR glory abroad? The answer would appear to be no. (…) The centralizing system employed in hockey to such great effect was never implemented in football – or any other sport for that matter. Upon careful consideration we see that in building TsSKA and Dynamo dynasties in Moscow, the military was not the architect, but rather a tool. The true originators of this system were none other than the longstanding national team coaches, Colonels Anatoly Tarasov and Arkady Chernyshev. (...)
Centralization...was never a policy of the Soviet sports bureaucracy. Rather, it was executed by leading Moscow coaches, on their own initiative. (…) As early as 1957, the Hockey Section resolved to petition the Army to defer the draft of talented young players, and leave them on their original clubs... most members of the Hockey Section were genuinely concerned with the further development of mass hockey participation, and the improvement of elite hockey outside the capital. Many realized that although player concentration may have helped the Soviet national team in the short term, the national program suffered long term damage from this policy. With the most talented players, coaches and specialists constantly migrating towards Moscow, hockey development in all other areas of the country was severely Pejorative Slured... Ultimately, there was little the Sports Committee could do to stop the Army from drafting whom it chose to... The pillage of the provincial hockey clubs was made very clear by the fact that while the Moscow teams remained dominant in league play throughout the Soviet period, they lost their dominance at the junior level by the mid 1960's.

Material situation of the players:

The material starting point for all Soviet players was their salary, which was euphemistically referred to as a stipend. During the 1960's and 1970's a Soviet player on one of the nation's leading teams had an official salary that was two to three times the sum the average worker could expect to earn. Players on lower level teams could expect to earn a decent worker's salary... In addition to their official stipends, players for the Soviet national team were paid substantial bonuses for important international victories. Winning an Olympic gold, for example, brought the players an official bonus of one-thousand rubles (one year's wages for many workers). Winning league championships and a variety of minors championships also brought sizable cash bonuses... Players were also rewarded – or enticed – with a variety of generous gifts, which were provided by the club teams. For example, as a sort of signing bonus, junior prodigy Aleksandr Maltsev was given a car by Moscow Dynamo: “For the first time in my life I received a car. I didn't buy it – I received it. It was done this way: players who distinguished themselves were given a personal car.” …[Valery] Vasilev...recalls that after joining Dynamo, he was given a one-room apartment to himself, something totally inconceivable for [an] average twenty year old bachelor. And, after he established himself as a[n] international star, his position improved further: “Later on, I was presented with a luxury apartment by Yuri Vladimirov Andropov. Naturally, I didn't get [this] for having pretty eyes.” And, in addition to expensive gifts, leading coaches and players had access to hard currency stores and, presumably, hard currency to spend there. (...)
But the true riches were reserved for the players who where the elite of the elite: players good enough to play on the Moscow core teams, and make it onto either the first or second Soviet national team. This group of players and coaches were given free reign – within the limits of reason – to engage in lucrative black market trade... a trip abroad was almost always a chance to enhance one's material situation. The principle was simple: using souvenirs, caviar, vodka and other Soviet goods which were desirable in the West, the players would obtain consumer goods for resale in the USSR, or hard currency... Fortunately for the history of Soviet hockey, the Party was pragmatic enough to bend the rules in this instance and made no effort to punish what would otherwise be considered very serious violations of Soviet law. (...)


Scientific approach:

Every year, lengthy training and activity programs would be developed and approved, which were binding on a nation-wide scale. The first such reports appear in the archival record beginning in 1956. In addition to setting – or at least approving – training approaches in general terms the Hockey Section passed concrete targets for individual players, to guide their off-season training. For example, in 1957/58 players were expected to be able [to] sprint a distance of fifty meters in 5.8 seconds, and one-hundred meters in 11.9. (...)
In addition to target setting, the Hockey Section organized a seemingly endless succession of conferences and planning sessions, which focused on theoretical matters of training and tactics. A national education program for coaches of all levels was set up, with the hours to be spent on each subject carefully delineated, for the purpose of teaching correct approaches to training, technique and strategy. In addition to these conferences, the Hockey Section oversaw the production and distribution of a wealth of technical and educational literature on the sport. From the earliest days of Soviet hockey, committees of coaches were periodically convened to collaborate on books: first studies about hockey in Canada and in other countries, and then, as the Soviet program advanced, more inward looking studies. Finally, the Hockey Section maintained full academic programs dedicated to the study of ice-hockey at all the nation's leading physical culture institutions.

––––––––––––––––

Will post more the upcoming days.

The bolded is extremely interesting.

First the elite players relative to NA minor leaguers and 1960s, pre WHA NHL / minor league fringers were very well. There was no financial incentive to defect with the hope of gaining a financial benefit in NA.


Second point is even more important. The players were rewarded for team success -the collective as opposed to individual success which would explain why few elite players were left on the marginal club teams. Also this would explain the lack of statistical interest in various individual achievements.
 
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Killion

Registered User
Feb 19, 2010
36,763
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Second point is even more important. The players were rewarded for team success -the collective as opposed to individual success which would explain why few elite players were left on the marginal club teams. Also this would explain the lack of statistical interest in various individual achievements.

Yes its fascinating, but at the same time if you were alive & cognizant, followed the Soviet sports programming through the 50's & 60's, the 70's & 80's, not exactly an epiphany. We knew that. We knew they were playing games, playing coy. That sport was little more than a tool to be used for the purposes of propaganda. That without "guaranteed wins" they gutlessly simply wouldnt show up. Through the subversion & enabling of the IIHF slanted the ice. The whole thing was a farce. I played against the Mens National Team as a Junior prior to 1972 (along with the Czechs) and while highly competitive I was absolutely dumbfounded, in fact stunned that they seemed so incapable of closing a deal in real time when they had virtually all of my Defenceman & Forwards beat & out of position (and note; none of the players on my Jr team over 19 at that time and not supported by pro's or semi-pro's). It was like they were just "out for a skate" and were not at all happy to be on the receiving end of just general physicality in terms of puck possession. Very bizarre games. Like an All Star Game, geared towards Tournament Play. And I hated, most Canadians of my era & age disliked Tournament Hockey. Politicized. Canadians just dont deal with that real well. Incorrect and dont care.
 

Theokritos

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Apr 6, 2010
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Chronological Overview 1946-1974

1946:
Sports Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR orders elite bandy ("Russian hockey", "hockey with the ball") players to switch to Canadian hockey ("puck hockey"). First domestic championship, won by Dinamo Moscow under player-coach Arkadiy Chernyshov.

1947-48:
Second championship, won by the Army team (then CDKA Moscow) under player-coach Anatoliy Tarasov. Sport Committee accused of "destroying Russian hockey in favour of Canadian hockey" by youth wing of the Communist Party. Future of Canadian hockey in the USSR is in danger until Sports Committee head Nikolay Romanov manages to win the support of Marshal Voroshilov, a high-ranking government official.

February 1948:
LTC Prague, one of the leading hockey teams in Europe, pays a visit to Moscow.

1948-49 and 1949-50:
Tarasov's Army team successfully defends its domestic title.

1950:
VVS MVO Moscow (Air Force team under the patronage of Josef Stalin's son Vasily) lures away several players from the Army team. The exodus is led by star forward Vsevolod Bobrov who leaves on bad terms with Tarasov.

1950-51, 51-52 and 52-53:
The Air Force team under player-coach Bobrov wins three domestic titles in a row.

1952-53:
Soviet national team supposed to appear at the World Championship for the first time. However, an injury sidelining Bobrov makes the Central Committee of the Communist Party nervous and they ask coach Chernyshov whether he can “guarantee victory”. His answer is negative and the Soviet participation is canceled.

1953:
After the death of Josef Stalin his son Vasily ends up in prison and the Air Force team is dissolved. Bobrov returns to the Army team – presumably rather reluctantly.

1953-54:
A great season for Chernyshov: Dinamo Moscow wins the domestic championship and the Soviet national team takes home the gold medal in its first appearance at the World Championship.

1954-55:
Domestic championship won by the Army Team under Tarasov, World Championship by Canada.

1955-56:
The Army team defends its domestic title. The Soviet national team defeats the Canadians again and win Olympic gold.

1956-57:
Domestic championship won by Krylja Sovietov under Vladimir Yegorov, assistant coach at the national team.
With the world championship taking place in Moscow and the Canadians refusing to participate, the national team is fully expected to finish first. However, the Soviets are unable to defeat the Swedes (led by Sven 'Tumba' Johansson) and lose the title to them on goal differential. The embarrassment before the home audience leads to the dismissal of Chernyshov and Yegorov. Tarasov takes over. Not getting along with him, Bobrov decides to quit hockey altogether.

1957-58, 58-59 and 59-60:
Tarasov wins three domestic titles with the Army team but fails to win a World Championship resp. an Olympic tournament. After three attempts he is released. Chernyshov becomes national coach again.

1960-61:
A player mutiny cost Tarasov his job at the Army team. Under his successor Aleksandr Vinogradov the club (finally named CSKA) wins its fourth domestic title in a row. National team: no title under Chernyshov either.

1961-62:
New CSKA coach Yevgeni Babych doesn't stay in office for long, a 5-14 defeat against Dinamo Moscow leads to the return of Tarasov. The championship is won by Spartak Moscow under coach Aleksandr Novokreshchonov. World championship in the USA boycotted by the Soviets.

1962-63:
CSKA top in the domestic championship again. Tarasov returns to the national team as assistant coach. Soviets win their first World Championship gold since 1956.

In the following period the Soviets dominate international hockey. Chernyshov and Tarasov guide them to ten first place finishes in a row. Domestic competition is dominated by CSKA. The only upsets: Spartak Moscow wins in 1966-67 (under Bobrov) and 1968-69 (under Nikolay Karpov).

1968-69:
In the decisive game against Spartak Moscow, Tarasov draws the ire of the authorities by sending his team to the dressing room in protest against a controversial call. The minister of defence has to order the team back on the ice and Tarasov is stripped off the title "Merited Coach of the USSR". He receives it back after the 1970 World Championship.

1971-72:
The Czechoslovaks declare that Tarasov is not welcome at the World Championship in Prague after he has publicly berated Václav Nedomanský during the Olympics. Under new coaches Bobrov (head) and Nikolay Puchkov (assistant) the Soviet national team fails to win in Prague.

1972-73 and 73-74:
Bobrov and his new assistant Boris Kulagin lead the Soviets back to gold at the World Championship.

1973-74:
A great year for Kulagin whose club Krylja Sovietov upsets CSKA Moscow to win the domestic championship.

1974:
Tarasov resigns as CSKA coach and is succeeded by Konstantin Loktev. Kulagin replaces Bobrov as head coach of the national team.
 
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aemoreira1981

Registered User
Jan 27, 2012
7,168
304
New York City
The bolded is extremely interesting.

First the elite players relative to NA minor leaguers and 1960s, pre WHANHL / minor league fringers were very well. There was no financial incentive to defect with the hope of gaining a financial benefit in NA.


Second point is even more important. The players were rewarded for team success -the collective as opposed to individual success which would explain why few elite players were left on the marginal club teams. Also this would explain the lack of statistical interest in various individual achievements.

That also goes a long way into explaining their success as a team on the world stage, as fundamentally sound hockey has to be developed that might discourage too much risk-taking (i.e., a play that looks fantastic if it works, but can blow up in your face if it does not).
 

Theokritos

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Apr 6, 2010
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Grass-root level and minor hockey

More excerpts from Paul Harder's Thesis.

Semi-organized hockey
The USSR lacked the resources to set up organized minor hockey. Its equivalent consisted of grass roots initiatives where boys build and maintained their own facilities, and organized their own games and practices... Boys, under the sponsorship of an adult, usually a local retiree, organized themselves into teams... Games were played on smaller rinks which were to be constructed on any ice surface with 'boards' marked by snow-banks or crude barriers of any sort, and self-made equipment was not ruled out... The most basic rink design was so simple that it could be built simply by clearing the snow from a regulation size patch of ice, and using the snow banks as boards. Of course, hockey enthusiasts had already been doing this long before the Hockey Section instructed them to do so. However, by providing instructions on regulation sized surfaces, and by organizing large scale tournaments based on these rules, the Hockey Section was able to 'standardize' popular ice-hockey, and create a semi-organized national recreational hockey system, with very little investment... The idea spread quickly and, by the 1960's crude ice hockey was a fixture at apartment complexes throughout the USSR's major cities.

Mass participation
Resting on the loose institutionalized framework established by the Hockey Section, the city tournaments increased in popularity, and competitions began to be organized at regional levels... in 1964 the system of tournaments according to simplified rules evolved into a nation-wide children and youth tournament knows as the Golden Puck... regional winners played city championships; city champions competed for provincial/republican titles and republican champions proceeded to play at the national level... boys who were registered with any organized team were strictly forbidden from playing... Anatoly Tarasov...in attendance at the 1968 national championship: "There are 5-7 players on every team that could play in any children's club teams. Earlier, I could name only one, and rarely two." ...Three to four million boys participated annually during the 1960's and 1970's... It can safely be said that most future elite players would compete in at least one Golden Puck tournament before joining a children's club team... Children's programs were administered directly by the professional teams... By the mid-1960's children as young as eight would be trained in schools directly affiliated to a leading elite team, providing the nation's elite program with a steady supply of new recruits.

Decline
Although the process of decline accelerated after the collapse of the USSR, it had already begun with a decline in participatory hockey in the late 1970's and 1980's.
 

steve141

Registered User
Aug 13, 2009
1,144
240
I think one of the most important findings is the re-understanding of the role of the Communist Party in the Soviet Hockey program. If we believe Paul Harder, the traditional view that the Communist Party created the hockey program and used the army to run it is wrong.

He argues that the sport committee identified hockey as a viable sport for the Soviets to compete in at the Olympics, but that the Party preferred that they focused on "Russian Hockey" (bandy). The reason the army got involved was rather as a way for the sports committee to give hockey protection from the Party than the other way around.

Even then the Party didn't push for USSR to compete in international competitions but repeatedly had to be convinced that the USSR would win before the team was allowed to play. Only once the national team started dominating in the 60s did the Party take special interest in hockey, eager to tie the team's victories to the success of the nation.
 

turkulad

Registered User
Sep 27, 2011
1,856
235
Turku, Finland
I think one of the most important findings is the re-understanding of the role of the Communist Party in the Soviet Hockey program. If we believe Paul Harder, the traditional view that the Communist Party created the hockey program and used the army to run it is wrong.

He argues that the sport committee identified hockey as a viable sport for the Soviets to compete in at the Olympics, but that the Party preferred that they focused on "Russian Hockey" (bandy). The reason the army got involved was rather as a way for the sports committee to give hockey protection from the Party than the other way around.

Even then the Party didn't push for USSR to compete in international competitions but repeatedly had to be convinced that the USSR would win before the team was allowed to play. Only once the national team started dominating in the 60s did the Party take special interest in hockey, eager to tie the team's victories to the success of the nation.

I'm at the moment reading a Finnish book about the Soviet ice hockey system, from the early stages of its development (as the USSR regime started to appreciate its ability to highlight the strength of the Soviet ideology globally) to its eventual dominance in international competition. It's written by Markku Jokisipila, the only Finnish historian who has written and published extensively on ice hockey. He argues similarly to Harder (judging from your paraphrasing) that the ice hockey team wasn't allowed to participate in championship tournaments before they were able to assure the political brass of their sure victory. If you couldn't personally guarantee success as a coach or a team manager, you weren't allowed to participate.. and if you did guarantee it and failed, the repercussions were intimidating. Even Tarasov and Chernyshev were not immune to this approach, and were both sacked after losses considered embarrassing, until they were given simultaneous coaching posts for the USSR team, a decision which was followed by some of the most dominating international hockey the world ever saw.

This applied not only to ice hockey, however, but to all sports - and also is shown by the USSR Olympic boycotts preceding their eventual premier on Olympic circles. Bandy, while more dominated by Russians, didn't have the same global appeal as ice hockey did, and the USSR dominance was also aided by the tight amateur rules of the IIHF, which resulted in severely underskilled Canadian teams being sent to international competitions and eventually saw Canada boycott such games for several years because of the USSR's obvious disregard for the rules.

Sounds like a interesting thesis, for sure! I'll have to add it to my to-read queue.
 

Killion

Registered User
Feb 19, 2010
36,763
3,215
I don't get it. Can you please clarify? Are you saying Soviet forwards couldn't score? :amazed:

They often over-played the puck & their hand. Theres a point of no return when being patient with the puck & if you outwaited them while being positionally sound and without error they'd be forced wide or deep to the perimeters. Provided your Defenceman & forwards didnt freak out, they too maintaining their positions & cool the Russians would cough up the puck. Unfortunately most Canadian players of the era in which Im referring to (in their own end) did freak, two, sometimes even three of them peeling off to take out one Russian leaving 1-2-3 of the 5 man unit wide open. The only way to stop them was to stand them up at Center, Trap. In 72 for example it took Sinden until I think it was Game 3 or 4 to even realize that whereas with Junior Club exhibitions & other games that had been played against them in the 60's & early 70's a considerable number of these "lesser than" NHL Coaches at the Jr. & elite amateur levels well aware of it.
 

Canadiens1958

Registered User
Nov 30, 2007
20,020
2,778
Lake Memphremagog, QC.
Pre WWII Canada

More excerpts from Paul Harder's Thesis.

Semi-organized hockey
The USSR lacked the resources to set up organized minor hockey. Its equivalent consisted of grass roots initiatives where boys build and maintained their own facilities, and organized their own games and practices... Boys, under the sponsorship of an adult, usually a local retiree, organized themselves into teams... Games were played on smaller rinks which were to be constructed on any ice surface with 'boards' marked by snow-banks or crude barriers of any sort, and self-made equipment was not ruled out... The most basic rink design was so simple that it could be built simply by clearing the snow from a regulation size patch of ice, and using the snow banks as boards. Of course, hockey enthusiasts had already been doing this long before the Hockey Section instructed them to do so. However, by providing instructions on regulation sized surfaces, and by organizing large scale tournaments based on these rules, the Hockey Section was able to 'standardize' popular ice-hockey, and create a semi-organized national recreational hockey system, with very little investment... The idea spread quickly and, by the 1960's crude ice hockey was a fixture at apartment complexes throughout the USSR's major cities.

Mass participation
Resting on the loose institutionalized framework established by the Hockey Section, the city tournaments increased in popularity, and competitions began to be organized at regional levels... in 1964 the system of tournaments according to simplified rules evolved into a nation-wide children and youth tournament knows as the Golden Puck... regional winners played city championships; city champions competed for provincial/republican titles and republican champions proceeded to play at the national level... boys who were registered with any organized team were strictly forbidden from playing... Anatoly Tarasov...in attendance at the 1968 national championship: "There are 5-7 players on every team that could play in any children's club teams. Earlier, I could name only one, and rarely two." ...Three to four million boys participated annually during the 1960's and 1970's... It can safely be said that most future elite players would compete in at least one Golden Puck tournament before joining a children's club team... Children's programs were administered directly by the professional teams... By the mid-1960's children as young as eight would be trained in schools directly affiliated to a leading elite team, providing the nation's elite program with a steady supply of new recruits.

Decline
Although the process of decline accelerated after the collapse of the USSR, it had already begun with a decline in participatory hockey in the late 1970's and 1980's.
Youth hockey - imitates pre WWII Canada for pre teen players.
 

Canadiens1958

Registered User
Nov 30, 2007
20,020
2,778
Lake Memphremagog, QC.
Details

More excerpts from Paul Harder's Thesis.

Semi-organized hockey
The USSR lacked the resources to set up organized minor hockey. Its equivalent consisted of grass roots initiatives where boys build and maintained their own facilities, and organized their own games and practices... Boys, under the sponsorship of an adult, usually a local retiree, organized themselves into teams... Games were played on smaller rinks which were to be constructed on any ice surface with 'boards' marked by snow-banks or crude barriers of any sort, and self-made equipment was not ruled out... The most basic rink design was so simple that it could be built simply by clearing the snow from a regulation size patch of ice, and using the snow banks as boards. Of course, hockey enthusiasts had already been doing this long before the Hockey Section instructed them to do so. However, by providing instructions on regulation sized surfaces, and by organizing large scale tournaments based on these rules, the Hockey Section was able to 'standardize' popular ice-hockey, and create a semi-organized national recreational hockey system, with very little investment... The idea spread quickly and, by the 1960's crude ice hockey was a fixture at apartment complexes throughout the USSR's major cities.

Mass participation
Resting on the loose institutionalized framework established by the Hockey Section, the city tournaments increased in popularity, and competitions began to be organized at regional levels... in 1964 the system of tournaments according to simplified rules evolved into a nation-wide children and youth tournament knows as the Golden Puck... regional winners played city championships; city champions competed for provincial/republican titles and republican champions proceeded to play at the national level... boys who were registered with any organized team were strictly forbidden from playing... Anatoly Tarasov...in attendance at the 1968 national championship: "There are 5-7 players on every team that could play in any children's club teams. Earlier, I could name only one, and rarely two." ...Three to four million boys participated annually during the 1960's and 1970's... It can safely be said that most future elite players would compete in at least one Golden Puck tournament before joining a children's club team... Children's programs were administered directly by the professional teams... By the mid-1960's children as young as eight would be trained in schools directly affiliated to a leading elite team, providing the nation's elite program with a steady supply of new recruits.

Decline
Although the process of decline accelerated after the collapse of the USSR, it had already begun with a decline in participatory hockey in the late 1970's and 1980's.

In the second half of the 1950s the Soviets toured Canada and played games against the Junior Canadiens in Montréal. During one of the trips a claim was made by a member of the entourage that the Soviets had 1,000,000 youngsters playing ice hockey. Will find the article when I have some time.

Key points that result are.

1.) Similar to Canada, pre 1970 there is little evidence of actual participation levels. We do see that certain regions may have been better at organizing, stratifying and recording participation - point raised by Tarheels, but there is no clear definition of what playing ice hockey means - could be a youngster trying skates and hitting a puck with a stick once in a lifetime for all we know. True for both countries.

2.) The stratification from introduction of youngsters, progressing to the elite level - National team or competing for the Stanley Cup is important. In Canada going back to 1890 we see signs of hockey becoming part of the school curriculum - grade, high school and university as well as a community activity, youth groups and centers, parishes, etc.Soviet approach did not seem to include schools and community ice hockey is vaguely defined.

3.) Other sports. Going back to 1836 there is historical data available about the role of sports and or military training for youngsters in the province of Québec - Donald Guay has done excellent work detailing and recording this. Soviets targeted various sports, not only ice hockey as worthy because of the Olympics - Summer and Winter. How was the introduction, teaching, development of these sports similar to ice hockey, different from ice hockey? Did youngsters develop multi-sport capabilities - like Lionel Conacher, Doug Harvey and others or were they encouraged to focus on one sport?
 

Theokritos

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Soviets targeted various sports, not only ice hockey as worthy because of the Olympics - Summer and Winter. How was the introduction, teaching, development of these sports similar to ice hockey, different from ice hockey?

Harder [p.79-80] draws a distinction between popular sports (football/soccer, hockey) on the one hand and "sports with little history and almost no popular following in the USSR created as a convenient way to produce Olympic gold medals" on the other hand. While the latter (don't know about football/soccer) where taught/coached at secondary schools specialized on sports, "ice-hockey was never taught at sports schools, probably because of the critical shortage in ice-rinks and equipment." [p.55]. Instead the more talented youngsters participating in the semi-organized hockey circuit were picked up by individual clubs via invitation to their own youth teams/hockey schools.

Did youngsters develop multi-sport capabilities - like Lionel Conacher, Doug Harvey and others or were they encouraged to focus on one sport?

Early Russian players basically grew up playing football/soccer during the summer and ice hockey* during the winter. Very common in most of Europe back then actually.

*Either the traditional "hockey with the ball" or the recently picked up "hockey with the puck" or both. As of 1957 the production of bandy sticks still outnumbered the production of Canadian-style sticks in the USSR: 256,000 vs 194,000.
 

Zine

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Harder [p.79-80] draws a distinction between popular sports (football/soccer, hockey) on the one hand and "sports with little history and almost no popular following in the USSR created as a convenient way to produce Olympic gold medals" on the other hand. While the latter (don't know about football/soccer) where taught/coached at secondary schools specialized on sports, "ice-hockey was never taught at sports schools, probably because of the critical shortage in ice-rinks and equipment." [p.55]. Instead the more talented youngsters participating in the semi-organized hockey circuit were picked up by individual clubs via invitation to their own youth teams/hockey schools.



Early Russian players basically grew up playing football/soccer during the summer and ice hockey* during the winter. Very common in most of Europe back then actually.

*Either the traditional "hockey with the ball" or the recently picked up "hockey with the puck" or both. As of 1957 the production of bandy sticks still outnumbered the production of Canadian-style sticks in the USSR: 256,000 vs 194,000.


Correct. It's the reason why professional footballers like Bobrov, Trofimov, Seglin, Netto, Yashin, etc. were able to transition to hockey with ease, they were already well versed in bandy (some at a higher level too). Same for tennis players Novikov and Zigmund.
 

Theokritos

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Correct. It's the reason why professional footballers like Bobrov, Trofimov, Seglin, Netto, Yashin, etc. were able to transition to hockey with ease, they were already well versed in bandy (some at a higher level too). Same for tennis players Novikov and Zigmund.

Indeed. The notion that guys like Bobrov had to learn how to skate first in 1946 is inaccurate, in reality they grew up doing just that and playing a hockey-like stick-and-ball game on ice.
 

Theokritos

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Decline of the Soviet hockey program

Paul Harder (p.94):
Although the process of decline accelerated after the collapse of the USSR, it had already begun with a decline in participatory hockey in the late 1970's and 1980's.

If this statement is true, then one would expect the second half of the 1980s to be the time when the diminution of the talent pool became noticeable (since the children of the late 70s and early 80s reached senior age around that time). And indeed:

It appears that well before the fall of the Iron Curtain, the USSR hockey program was already in decline, especially when it comes to defensemen

Providence Journal, Feb 14, 1987
In one move interpreted as desperation, 31-year-old Zinetula Bilyaletdinov was added to the touring squad shortly before the Soviets left for Quebec, although he hadn't qualified for the national squad in years. (For the Soviets, 30 is nearly ancient in hockey terms. Once past that "golden" age, players are routinely farmed out or given coaching duties.)

The pool of young talent has evidently dried up. The Soviets went victoryless in the recent fight-filled junior championships. [Alan Eagleson] said he couldn't recall seeing a worse collection of Soviet juniors.

Now it's not exactly true that Bilyaletdinov "hadn't qualified for the national squad in years", in fact he only had been dropped from the national team ten months earlier, after the 1986 World Championship. But being dropped at his age previously had meant one's national team career was over (except for one or two exhibition games occasionally). Examples: Gusev (30), Tsygankov (31), Lutchenko (31) and Vasiliev (32) - neither of them played in another high profile tournament afterwards. Bilyaletdinov was 31 when he was let go in April 1986 and that was supposed to be it. But Tikhonov and Yurzinov couldn't find another defenceman capable of replacing him in the next big events (February 1987: Rendez-vouz '87, April 1987: World Championship). At the last minute Bilyaletdinov was called back to the national team in February 87, an unprecedented move as far as I can see. Of the guys next in line (who were tried out in several games from November to January) only Mikhail Tatarinov (20 years old) made to cut - merely to be sorted out again prior to the World Championship. None of the others (Alexander Fatkullin, Igor Yevdokimov and Vladimir Tyurikov; a 19-year-old Vladimir Konstantinov also got a look, but he was used more as a forward on that occasion) were trusted enough by the coaches to even handle a rather minor role in the national team. But of course Bilyaletdinov couldn't play forever ("forever" in Soviet terms, not in NHL or rest-of-the world terms). For the 1987 Canada Cup two younger blueliners were introduced to the national team: Anatoli Fedotov and Igor Kravchuk, both 21. It was the first and only major tournament for Fedotov while Kravchuk of course went on to have a respectable career.

From the following year (1988) we have an account by coaching legend Anatoli Tarasov. In a publication titled "Real hockey men" (russ. Настоящие мужчины хоккея, Link) he addresses Boris Kulagin's decision back in 1977 to play Slava Fetisov in the World Championship after he had just turned 19:

Anatoli Tarasov:
Defencemen of such young age rarely make the squad at competitions like the World Championship – after all, the steadiness and reliability required from defensive players usually comes with age. Admittedly, one could hold against the author that in recent years young defencemen haven't been a rarity in the national team. However, this is solely a consequence of the lack of defencemen. Back then in the late 70s in contrast, the national coaches had much more options to choose from and and still they went with Fetisov.

Original (p.13 in the link above):
Столь молодых защитников редко вводят в состав на таких соревнованиях, как чемпионаты мира, – ведь необходимые для игрока обороны стабильность и надежность обычно приходят с годами. Правда, автору могут возразить, что в последние годы молодые защитники в сборной – не редкость. Но это лишь следствие возникшего дефицита игроков обороны. Тогда же, в конце 70-х годов, у тренеров сборной выбор был куда шире и тем не менее они остановились на Фетисове.

Tarasov must have had Tatarinov, Fedotov and Kravchuk in mind when he wrote of "young defencemen [who] haven't been a rarity in the national team in recent years" since those three were the only defencemen 21 and younger who had played in a major tournament in the three years prior to 1988. Granted, there are several earlier cases of defencemen of a similar age, but the accumulation in 1987 is unusual and Tarasov specifically points out that there used to be a greater number of (talented) defencemen back in the late 1970s. He should have been in a good position to observe and judge hockey development in the USSR.
 
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Canadiens1958

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Participation

If this statement is true, then one would expect the second half of the 1980s to be the time when the diminution of the talent pool became noticeable (since the children of the late 70s and early 80s reached senior age around that time). And indeed:



Now it's not exactly true that Bilyaletdinov "hadn't qualified for the national squad in years", in fact he only had been dropped from the national team ten months earlier, after the 1986 World Championship. But being dropped at his age previously had meant one's national team career was over (except for one or two exhibition games occasionally). Examples: Gusev (30), Tsygankov (31), Lutchenko (31) and Vasiliev (32) - neither of them played in another high profile tournament afterwards. Bilyaletdinov was 31 when he was let go in April 1986 and that was supposed to be it. But Tikhonov and Yurzinov couldn't find another defenceman capable of replacing him in the next big events (February 1987: Rendez-vouz '87, April 1987: World Championship). At the last minute Bilyaletdinov was called back to the national team in February 87, an unprecedented move as far as I can see. Of the guys next in line (who were tried out in several games from November to January) only Mikhail Tatarinov (20 years old) made to cut - merely to be sorted out again prior to the World Championship. None of the others (Alexander Fatkullin, Igor Yevdokimov and Vladimir Tyurikov; a 19-year-old Vladimir Konstantinov also got a look, but he was used more as a forward on that occasion) were trusted enough by the coaches to even handle a rather minor role in the national team. But of course Bilyaletdinov couldn't play forever ("forever" in Soviet terms, not in NHL or rest-of-the world terms). For the 1987 Canada Cup two younger blueliners were introduced to the national team: Anatoli Fedotov and Igor Kravchuk, both 21. It was the first and only major tournament for Fedotov while Kravchuk of course went on to have a respectable career.

From the following year (1988) we have an account by coaching legend Anatoli Tarasov. In a publication titled "Real hockey men" (russ. Настоящие мужчины хоккея, Link) he addresses Boris Kulagin's decision back in 1977 to play Slava Fetisov in the World Championship after he had just turned 19:



Tarasov must have had Tatarinov, Fedotov and Kravchuk in mind when he wrote of "young defencemen [who] haven't been a rarity in the national team in recent years" since those three were the only defencemen 21 and younger who had played in a major tournament in the three years prior to 1988. Granted, there are several earlier cases of defencemen of a similar age, but the accumulation in 1987 is unusual and Tarasov specifically points out that there used to be a greater number of (talented) defencemen back in the late 1970s. He should have been in a good position to observe and judge hockey development in the USSR.

Same thing happened in Canada, especially Montréal around 1970, coinciding with a sharp decrease in birth rates and school registration. Centralized organization started the decline. 1970, one district, Roasemount had over thirty association offering youth hockey. Today the district features two associations, merging into one for next season.
 

turkulad

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Some things that should be taken into account when talking the somewhat noticeable slump/decline of the ice hockey during the 1970-1980 were the effects the system of the national hockey league had on the intrigue of the sport: since the three Muscovy had their military ties, they could easily call any potentially elite player from the teams in other cities into active duty, transferring them to their ranks and effectively killing the chances of the other teams to actively challenge them. They were pretty much cherry picking the other systems with no checks.

This would regress the morale of all parties involved - the coaches who knew they couldn't challenge for higher ranking positions in vacancies other than the big three Moscow clubs and/or the national team; the players who realized that they were stuck development and successwise on their respective clubs if they couldn't contend in the big three, and while enjoying stable but altogether mediocre wages would try and find a team where they would have to work the least to get their paychecks; the fans who saw the USSR dominate in the IIHF games year in and year out and got bored of the Russian league which effectively was a huge training camp for the Red Army teams in preparation for yearly national competitions - even if the sport was meant to provide enjoyment to native Russian along with its more important political agenda, it failed to do so as the system was honed to perfection. And when the sport became more and more boring to watch, it must have had an effect on the youth too and make less and less put on a pair of skates themselves - if you by a miracle got your hands on a decent pair.

The Jokisipilä book quotes that even in the late 1980s, when Lawrence Martin was working in Russia a prestigious (unnamed) Russian player from a Muscovy club asked him to deliver hockey sticks to him from Canada. All the trainers on USSR national teams, according to the same author, had as "their most essential task" during international tournament the joy of asking, even begging the staff of other team for any leftover hockey equipment they could spare. If this was the case for the pride and joy of the whole USSR.. I dare not imagine the difficulties a coach or a trainer managing a team in the outskirts of the empire would have day in and day out.
 
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Zine

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If this statement is true, then one would expect the second half of the 1980s to be the time when the diminution of the talent pool became noticeable (since the children of the late 70s and early 80s reached senior age around that time). And indeed:



Now it's not exactly true that Bilyaletdinov "hadn't qualified for the national squad in years", in fact he only had been dropped from the national team ten months earlier, after the 1986 World Championship. But being dropped at his age previously had meant one's national team career was over (except for one or two exhibition games occasionally). Examples: Gusev (30), Tsygankov (31), Lutchenko (31) and Vasiliev (32) - neither of them played in another high profile tournament afterwards. Bilyaletdinov was 31 when he was let go in April 1986 and that was supposed to be it. But Tikhonov and Yurzinov couldn't find another defenceman capable of replacing him in the next big events (February 1987: Rendez-vouz '87, April 1987: World Championship). At the last minute Bilyaletdinov was called back to the national team in February 87, an unprecedented move as far as I can see. Of the guys next in line (who were tried out in several games from November to January) only Mikhail Tatarinov (20 years old) made to cut - merely to be sorted out again prior to the World Championship. None of the others (Alexander Fatkullin, Igor Yevdokimov and Vladimir Tyurikov; a 19-year-old Vladimir Konstantinov also got a look, but he was used more as a forward on that occasion) were trusted enough by the coaches to even handle a rather minor role in the national team. But of course Bilyaletdinov couldn't play forever ("forever" in Soviet terms, not in NHL or rest-of-the world terms). For the 1987 Canada Cup two younger blueliners were introduced to the national team: Anatoli Fedotov and Igor Kravchuk, both 21. It was the first and only major tournament for Fedotov while Kravchuk of course went on to have a respectable career.

From the following year (1988) we have an account by coaching legend Anatoli Tarasov. In a publication titled "Real hockey men" (russ. Настоящие мужчины хоккея, Link) he addresses Boris Kulagin's decision back in 1977 to play Slava Fetisov in the World Championship after he had just turned 19:



Tarasov must have had Tatarinov, Fedotov and Kravchuk in mind when he wrote of "young defencemen [who] haven't been a rarity in the national team in recent years" since those three were the only defencemen 21 and younger who had played in a major tournament in the three years prior to 1988. Granted, there are several earlier cases of defencemen of a similar age, but the accumulation in 1987 is unusual and Tarasov specifically points out that there used to be a greater number of (talented) defencemen back in the late 1970s. He should have been in a good position to observe and judge hockey development in the USSR.



It's interesting that the unprecedented lack of defensive depth circa 1986-1989 didn't correspond to the rate of declining forwards. Chance? Cyclical, ebb and flow of talent production? I'm not sure.
Obviously Soviet hockey was in decline by the late 1980s, but we still have Konstantinov, Kravchuk, Zubov, Malakhov, Yushkevich, Zhitnik, Mironov, Kasparaitis, Gonchar, etc in the pipeline. Certainly no Fetisovs or Kasatonovs were produced, however defensive depth circa 1995 far exceeds that circa 1987.

On an semi-related note, Fetisov recently gave an interview stating that 200 hockey schools were closed when the USSR fell. Devastating.
 

Theokritos

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One of the obstacles early Soviet hockey had to deal with was the shortage of equipment like hockey sticks, especially quality sticks that didn't easily break. Existing production sites in Lviv (Ukraine), Riga (Latvia) and Tallinn (Estonia) were ordered to reduce their output of bandy sticks in favour of sticks suited for "puck hockey". As of 1957, eleven years after the introduction of Canadian ice hockey in the USSR, the annual production of hockey sticks in the Soviet Union added up to 194,000 (bandy sticks: 256,000). In 1963 a sports factory was set up in Moscow, producing 500,000 hockey sticks per year and ensuring mass participatory hockey in the capital.

Further development of annual production in the USSR: 1970: 3,709,000 hockey sticks. 1980: 10,576,000 hockey sticks.
 

Killion

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Further development of annual production in the USSR: 1970: 3,709,000 hockey sticks. 1980: 10,576,000 hockey sticks.

Interesting. Do you know of what quality they were & was there a brand name? Did they export? Import higher quality for the elite league & teams? Partnership maybe with say Koho or Torspo or one of the Scandinavian mfgs?
 

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