Study of the penalty killing of Soviet forwards during the 1960-1990 time frame

[Canadiens1958]

Having a winning ratio while being shorthanded – that's the hurdle the Soviets have to take now? Being -2 after 22 PP opportunities for a Team Canada featuring Gretzky and Lemieux is a negative now? I sure hope you apply THAT standard to all teams in hockey history...



These are two separate questions that shouldn't be lumped together. The thread is about PK, it wasn't stated that the Soviets were outstanding defensively at even strength.



It would be very welcome if you could give us some specifics instead of making general statements.

I do, see my work on Carbonneau vs Lemieux on the PK.

First time I have seen such a diachotomy. The two - ES and PK defence go together, cannot be separated.

Did give specifics. None are disputed Let's see, 20 GA in 4 games, blowing 2 and 3 goal leads in three of the games, 5 PPGA in 23 chances. These are all specifics and not in dispute.

The fundamental idea is to kill the penalty without being scored upon. SH goals are only face saving stats.

 

[Canadiens1958]

No, you provide it if you can. And please kindly explain why the Soviet PK difficulties against 1974 Team Canada are somehow more relevant than better Soviet PK performances against better Canadian teams.

Glad to, we are here to learn.

1974 Team Canada was a very experienced team with a very unique roster that had the knowledge but lacked the legs of their younger days.

Team had five experienced PP quarterbacks. Gordie Howe(RW), Bobby Hull(LW), André Lacroix(C), J.C. Tremblay(LD/RD) and Pat Stapleton(LD/RD). Furthermore they could run the PP from anyone of the five positions, assuming all the varied roles and willing to play support roles. Some - Hull, Howe, could play the point or two of theohe 1974 esion of th forward positions as a QB. No team ever brought such PP diversity. Sadly they lacked the legs of their prime years.

1972 Team Canada lacked such diversity and experience. They had interesting couplings from forward lines, interesting defencemen but lacked cohesion.

So the 1974 Team Canada while far from the best team did bring the best and most diverse PP talent. So in keeping with the logic of measuring against the best, the measure of the 1974 Soviet PK against 1974 Team Canada, WHA version, must be considered as well.

 

[Theokritos]

I do, see my work on Carbonneau vs Lemieux on the PK.

If we applied your statement ("having a winning ratio while being shorthanded") consistently, then very few teams and players in the history of the game would pass the test. A "winning ratio" during the PK is not something to expect even from elite defensive teams and elite penalty killers. Not having "a winning ratio" while being a man short is not an argument against anyone's penalty killing.

First time I have seen such a diachotomy. The two - ES and PK defence go together, cannot be separated.

Except that ES defence and PK do happen seperately on the ice during the game. I'm not saying there is no relation when you look at the skills of the individual players and the tactical approach of the team, but they're still not one and the same. A player who is not particularly good defensively at ES can still be a valuable part of a successful PK unit.

Did give specifics. None are disputed Let's see, 20 GA in 4 games, blowing 2 and 3 goal leads in three of the games, 5 PPGA in 23 chances. These are all specifics and not in dispute.

These are not specifics directly relating to the topic of the thread, which isn't ES hockey but PK/PP hockey.

The fundamental idea is to kill the penalty without being scored upon. SH goals are only face saving stats.

The fundamental idea of hockey is to win games. Which is achieved by scoring more goals than the opposing teams. Two tasks derive from this fundamental idea: 1) to score goals (offence) and 2) to prevent the opponent from scoring goals (defence).

There is no given "fundamental idea" of what to do while being shorthanded. In practice, killing the penalty without being scored upon is what a team strives for because that's usually the most beneficial outcome the team can realistically achieve. But going 0-2 in goal scored/conceded while being shorthanded is not effectively different or suprior to going 3-5 under the same circumstances. The result is the same as far as the purpose of the game is concerned: you concede 2 goals more than you score.

BTW, since you were talking about the "winning ratio": killing every singe penalty in your career successfully (which, of course, is completely utopian even for the best defensive forwards ever) still doesn't give you a winning ratio without those allegedly just "face saving" SH goals.

1974 Team Canada was a very experienced team with a very unique roster that had the knowledge but lacked the legs of their younger days.

Team had five experienced PP quarterbacks. Gordie Howe(RW), Bobby Hull(LW), André Lacroix(C), J.C. Tremblay(LD/RD) and Pat Stapleton(LD/RD). Furthermore they could run the PP from anyone of the five positions, assuming all the varied roles and willing to play support roles. Some - Hull, Howe, could play the point or two of theohe 1974 esion of th forward positions as a QB. No team ever brought such PP diversity. Sadly they lacked the legs of their prime years.

You have now listed some potential reasons why Team Canada 1974 could have been a better PP team than Team Canada 1972. (Which would probably even be disputed by some of the Canadian posters here if we started a Team Canada 72 vs Team Canada 74 debate, but whatever.)

What you haven't done:

1) You haven't told us why Team Canada 1974 is more relevant than later versions of Team Canada.

2) You haven't told us how exactly the Soviets were lacking defensively in comparison with the Canadians.

 

[Theokritos]

Glad to, we are here to learn.

I am most definitely and so are many others. But at times you get the feeling some posters – in particular very knowledgable ones – assume they already know everything and are either unwilling or unable to learn anything on their part as they exclusively view themselves as teachers. Even though even distinguished university lecturers reckognize they still have a lot to learn and willingly learn from their pupils whenever they can.

For example, the apparent unwillingness or unability to rethink and change one's view becomes apparent in the refusal to acknowledge that one might not have been entirely right from A to Z, and in the refusal to acknowledge that the opponent has a point that a well-meaning reading and non-polemical interpretation of his posts would have brought to light right away.

 

[Canadiens1958]

If we applied your statement ("having a winning ratio while being shorthanded") consistently, then very few teams and players in the history of the game would pass the test. A "winning ratio" during the PK is not something to expect even from elite defensive teams and elite penalty killers. Not having "a winning ratio" while being a man short is not an argument against anyone's penalty killing.



Except that ES defence and PK do happen seperately on the ice during the game. I'm not saying there is no relation when you look at the skills of the individual players and the tactical approach of the team, but they're still not one and the same. A player who is not particularly good defensively at ES can still be a valuable part of a successful PK unit.



These are not specifics directly relating to the topic of the thread, which isn't ES hockey but PK/PP hockey.



The fundamental idea of hockey is to win games. Which is achieved by scoring more goals than the opposing teams. Two tasks derive from this fundamental idea: 1) to score goals (offence) and 2) to prevent the opponent from scoring goals (defence).

There is no given "fundamental idea" of what to do while being shorthanded. In practice, killing the penalty without being scored upon is what a team strives for because that's usually the most beneficial outcome the team can realistically achieve. But going 0-2 in goal scored/conceded while being shorthanded is not effectively different or suprior to going 3-5 under the same circumstances. The result is the same as far as the purpose of the game is concerned: you concede 2 goals more than you score.

BTW, since you were talking about the "winning ratio": killing every singe penalty in your career successfully (which, of course, is completely utopian even for the best defensive forwards ever) still doesn't give you a winning ratio without those allegedly just "face saving" SH goals.



You have now listed some potential reasons why Team Canada 1974 could have been a better PP team than Team Canada 1972. (Which would probably even be disputed by some of the Canadian posters here if we started a Team Canada 72 vs Team Canada 74 debate, but whatever.)

What you haven't done:

1) You haven't told us why Team Canada 1974 is more relevant than later versions of Team Canada.

2) You haven't told us how exactly the Soviets were lacking defensively in comparison with the Canadians.

First bolded. So produce the seasons, circumstances and names of winning teams with negative ratios. No hypotheticals.

Second bolded. Academic position. Produce the name, season and relevant data for such a player.

Third bolded. Hockey is one of the few sports where a timed manpower penalty is imposed. Playing 4 on 5 is more tiring than 5 on 5. So the fundamental idea is to get back to even strength without giving up a goal and moving forward.

Academically and on paper the difference between 3 and 5 or 0 and 2 is the same, 2. On the ice and in preparations. the difference is huge. giving up 5 goals vs 2 means that you have 2.5 times as many defensive errors or lapses to fix. You cannot rely on the other team to not fix their PP. But as evidenced in 1987 the Soviets simply gave up too many goals to Canada.at ES - almost 4 per game. Like the Dutch boy who ran out of fingers, eventually they lost.

Last bolded. Claiming phantom support.

Team Canada 1974 is more relevant than later team Canada editions because they showed certain strengths and weaknesses that provided a challenge to future teams - Soviet and Canadian or others to replicate. Changed how rosters were viewed and put together. Look at the differences between the structure of 1972 and 1976 rosters. Canada made sure they had PP depth and diversity.

The Soviets were faced with a unique PK challenge in 1974 facing the WHA Team Canada, multiple reads produced by a variety of quarterbacking options. Usually a PP features one, maybe two go to options. 1974 Team Canada PP was in a position that generated upwards of five progressive reads for the Soviets. Getting all for PK skaters to make the reads in harmony is quite a challenge. They lacked the experience of facing a PP that made such demands. Takes time. Similar to the advantage Soviets PPs enjoyed against Canadian amateurs who were used to defending one or two read PPs not the 3-4 progressive reads that the Soviet PP demanded.

No different than today and the Washington PP with one option:

2017-18 Washington Capitals Roster and Statistics | Hockey-Reference.com

A bad Canadiens team is almost as efficient-2 goal difference despite, no center, no faceoff man and an injury to their key shooting defenceman.

2017-18 Montreal Canadiens Roster and Statistics | Hockey-Reference.com

1974, before or after the more reads a PP forces a team to make the harder it is for the PK to defend.

 

[Theokritos]

First bolded. So produce the seasons, circumstances and names of winning teams with negative ratios.

Negative ratios during the PK? Every single time in the history of the game. Every team that doesn't succesfully kill 100% of the PPs against them has a negative goal ratio during PK.

Second bolded. Academic position. Produce the name, season and relevant data for such a player.

To come up with a quick example, I'll defer to another poster:

Hull was a good penalty killer because he had the speed and the intimidation factor of a breakaway going the other way.

Go ahead if you feel like arguing with that guy...

Academically and on paper the difference between 3 and 5 or 0 and 2 is the same, 2. On the ice and in preparations. the difference is huge. giving up 5 goals vs 2 means that you have 2.5 times as many defensive errors or lapses to fix.

True, but you're only mentioning the defensive aspect here. My point was that defence isn't more valuable than offence by default. Going 3-5 as opposed to 0-2 also means you've got 3 goals' worth of superior offence. The outcome is the same: a ratio of -2.

But as evidenced in 1987 the Soviets simply gave up too many goals to Canada.at ES - almost 4 per game.

Which, as I've already suggested, is a legit topic of its own. But it still doesn't tell us a lot about the Soviet PK and its effectiveness.

Team Canada 1974 is more relevant than later team Canada editions because they showed certain strengths and weaknesses that provided a challenge to future teams

Okay, but:

Look at the differences between the structure of 1972 and 1976 rosters. Canada made sure they had PP depth and diversity.

So did later editions of Team Canada learn from 1974 or not? If they did, then how is Team Canada 74 the relevant yardstick again over the later & superior editions?

 

[Canadiens1958]

Negative ratios during the PK? Every single time in the history of the game. Every team that doesn't succesfully kill 100% of the PPs against them has a negative goal ratio during PK.



To come up with a quick example, I'll defer to another poster:



Go ahead if you feel like arguing with that guy...



True, but you're only mentioning the defensive aspect here. My point was that defence isn't more valuable than offence by default. Going 3-5 as opposed to 0-2 also means you've got 3 goals' worth of superior offence. The outcome is the same: a ratio of -2.



Which, as I've already suggested, is a legit topic of its own. But it still doesn't tell us a lot about the Soviet PK and its effectiveness.



Okay, but:



So did later editions of Team Canada learn from 1974 or not? If they did, then how is Team Canada 74 the relevant yardstick again over the later & superior editions?

No according to your earlier position if they scored more goals on the PK than they allowed they would have a positive ratio since this would create a situation where going on the PK would be advantageous. This has never happened.

Defer all you want. But lets be sporting and put a time limit on it.

No it is not the same at all. View it like broken dishes. If five dishes are broken but three are salvaged by gluing the pieces together you still have five broken dishes plus a waste of time gluing the three together with no guarantee that they will serve like whole dishes in the future. So adding five new whole dishes should be considered.

If only two dishes are broken. You have three whole dishes that do not need repair aqnd have the reliability expected of unbroken dishes. You only have to add two whole dishes.

1972 Team Canada lacked a number of things on their PP. Blaster from the point, ability to expand the offensive lanes by having puck movement from the half boards, from behind the net, the diversity of quickness and size in the slot. Phil Esposito only brought size. After 1974 WHA Team Canada the necessary changes were always made to the roster going in. Whether they were properly used at all times is another topic.

 

[Theokritos]

No according to your earlier position if they scored more goals on the PK than they allowed they would have a positive ratio since this would create a situation where going on the PK would be advantageous.

Being shorthanded is obviously never "advantageous", but if you managed to score more SH goals than you concede goals on the PK you clearly end up with a positive ratio. Regardless whether you concede 0 goals and score 1 or you concede 8 and score 9, the result is a positive ratio of +1.

This has never happened.

Exactly. Teams don't have positive/winning ratios while they're shorthanded. Whether it's 1-0 or 9-8: it doesn't happen in competitive hockey... And yet, not having a positive/winning ratio was what you used as an argument against the Soviet PK in post #71.

Defer all you want. But lets be sporting and put a time limit on it.

Sure, if you are sporting enough to clarify for us whether your stance has changed since that post. And if so, why and how it has changed.

No it is not the same at all. View it like broken dishes. If five dishes are broken but three are salvaged by gluing the pieces together you still have five broken dishes plus a waste of time gluing the three together with no guarantee that they will serve like whole dishes in the future. So adding five new whole dishes should be considered.

If only two dishes are broken. You have three whole dishes that do not need repair aqnd have the reliability expected of unbroken dishes. You only have to add two whole dishes.

This analogy doesn't work. In terms of value for the team: A goal is a goal, whether it's an ES goal or a PP goal or a SH goal. SH goals do not equal broken dishes that have been glued together. But even if they were somehow inferior or less valueable than other goals, your analogy would only work if a team started by allowing goals on the PP ("dishes broken") and then reacting with SH goals ("glued together"). If the team starts with scoring SH goals before conceding any PP goals, then the "broken" analogy fails even when you accepted the (faulty) premise of whole dishes vs broken dishes.

An actual analogy would work like this: At the beginning every game is tied 0-0. Each team has one dish: the initial clean sheet. You concede a goal, the dish is broken and gone. You score a goal, you add a new dish. There are no glued-together dishes as opposed to whole ones. There are just dishes and each dish that counts for either team is as "whole" and valuable as the others.

1972 Team Canada lacked a number of things on their PP. Blaster from the point, ability to expand the offensive lanes by having puck movement from the half boards, from behind the net, the diversity of quickness and size in the slot. Phil Esposito only brought size. After 1974 WHA Team Canada the necessary changes were always made to the roster going in. Whether they were properly used at all times is another topic.

The question remains why Team Canada 1974 out of all teams should be the ultimate yardstick for the Soviet PK over all the other and much superior editions of Team Canada. That looks like cherry picking to me.

 

[Batis]

Here comes the first half of the ranking list of the players who had the majority of their primes in the 80's. (1980-1990). The second half of the list and some additional comments on this era will be posted as soon as I find the time to finish them. Edit: Which should be sometime in the end of the coming week.

1. Sergey Makarov

Ice time finishes: 1st at the 1984 Canada Cup, 1st at the 1985 WHC, 1st at the 85/86 Super Series, Tied for 1st at the 1987 WHC, 1st at the 1988 WOG, 1st at the 88/89 Super Series, 2nd at the 1987 Rendezvous, 2nd at the 1989 WHC, Tied for 3rd at the 1981 WHC, 3rd at the 1983 WHC, Tied for 3rd at the 1987 Canada Cup, 4th at the 1981 Canada Cup, 4th at the 1986 WHC, 4th at the 1990 WHC, 6th at the 1982 WHC, 8th at the 1980 WOG, 8th at the 79/80 Super Series

Overall stats: 9 goals forward and 11 goals against over 117 min, 16 sec

Throughout the 80's Makarov and Krutov formed what in my opinion was the greatest penalty killing forward pairing that the Soviets ever had. Between 1984 and 1989 one of Makarov and Krutov was either 1st or tied for 1st in ice time at 10 of the 11 tournaments/series played during that time frame and at 6 of those they finished 1st and 2nd to each other. Both of them were incredible penalty killers and while Makarov probably has an edge over Krutov during that time frame (84-89) as well what clearly separates them in my opinion is Makarovs longevity as a top notch penalty killer considering that Makarov was the significantly stronger penalty killer in the early 80's and also had a reasonably strong performance at the 1990 WHC.

Doing this study made it even more obvious for me that standing out among the top Soviet forwards when it comes to puck possession while penalty killing was something extremely difficult to do considering how many of them mastered the skill to near perfection. But standing out in that company was exactly what Sergey Makarov still managed to do. Throughout his prime Makarov time and time again made his opponents realize that even if you are one of the very greatest players in the world (or of all time for that matter) you are still gonna have to work very hard to get the puck back even when you are on the powerplay. What made Makarov such a outstanding puck possession player was his combination of skating, stickhandling, vision and strenght/balance.

While Makarovs ability to play keep-away with the puck probably was his greatest strenght when playing shorthanded it was far from the only one. His skating ability also made him an extraordinary forechecker and backchecker throughout his prime years. Interestingly his mobility and ability to help out his defencemen was actually pointed out by Viktor Kuzkin to be the main reason why Tikhonov used him so much on the penalty kill. Makarovs mobility also meant that he was able to quickly cover much ice in his own zone which made him very useful on the 3 on 5.



A great example of what made Makarov such a dominant penalty killer. First Makarov kills off about 15 seconds of penalty time against the NHL All-Stars at the 1987 Rendezvous. Then he backchecks hard and pokechecks the puck away from Gretzky.



Really great 3 on 5 shift from Makarov against Sweden at the 1989 WHC. Then when Krutov comes on to the ice to make it a 4 on 5 they show some strong puck possession as usual.



Another great example of Makarovs ability to play keep-away with the puck while shorthanded. This time against Canada at the 1987 Canada Cup.

 

[Batis]

2. Vladimir Krutov

Ice time finishes: 1st at the 1984 WOG, 1st at the 1987 Rendezvous, 1st at the 1987 Canada Cup, 1st at the 1989 WHC, 2nd at the 1984 Canada Cup, 2nd at the 1985 WHC, 2nd at the 1988 WOG, Tied for 4th at the 82/83 Super Series, 5th at the 1986 WHC, 5th at the 1987 WHC, 5th at the 88/89 Super Series, Tied for 7th at the 1981 Canada Cup, 7th at the 1983 WHC

Overall stats: 7 goals forward and 12 goals against over 101 min, 1 sec

As mentioned earlier Krutov had a very impressive level of penalty killing over the 1984-1989 time frame and that stretch from Krutov measures up very well against any stretch of similar lenght from the other top Soviet penalty killers of all time.

Krutov, just like his linemate Makarov, mainly built his penalty killing on a combination of great puck possession, forechecking and backchecking. Krutov also showed time and time again that he could excell at penalty killing even when up against powerplay units with multiple of the greatest players of all time. In fact when up against powerplay units of the calibre of for example Gretzky, Lemeux, Messier, Bourque, Coffey or Gretzky, Trottier, Bossy, Lafleur, Potvin I can't think of many forward pairings in hockey history that I personally would like to have on the ice ahead of Krutov-Makarov since they consistently throughout the 80's showed that they were able to frustrate even such units with their puck possession, forechecking, backchecking and ability to score shorthanded goals on lightning quick counterattacks.

I really feel like many of Krutovs abilities as a hockey player often seems to get severely underrated. Like his skating, stickhandling and passing for example. These qualities were along with his strenght what made him such a great puck possession player. But Krutov was also very good at defending in his own zone as he for example was great on the 3 on 5.



Truly great shorthanded shift from Krutov and Makarov against Canada at the 1987 Canada Cup. They show some very impressive puck possession on two different occasions during this shift and just look at the way Krutov skates the puck out of his zone against Lemieux and then makes a great move on Coffey on the second puck possession occasion.



Really great 3 on 5 shift from Krutov against Canada at the 1989 WHC.



Some outstanding puck possession from Krutov and Makarov (plus Fetisov and Kasatonov) against the NHL-All Stars at the 1987 Rendezvous.

 

[Batis]

3. Vyacheslav Bykov

Ice time finishes: 1st at the 1986 WHC, Tied for 1st at the 1987 WHC, 1st at the 1990 WHC, 2nd at the 1987 Canada Cup, 2nd at the 88/89 Super Series, 3rd at the 1987 Rendezvous, 3rd at the 1988 WOG, 4th at the 1985 WHC, 4th at the 85/86 Super Series, 4th at the 1989 WHC, Tied for 6th at the 1983 WHC, 7th at the 82/83 Super Series

Overall stats: 3 goals forward and 10 goals against over 97 min, 53 sec

Even if I already knew that Vyacheslav Bykov was a great penalty killer his performances still somewhat exceeded my expectations. Bykov formed a longtime forward pairing with Khomutov and at times they played at such a high level that they even gave the Krutov-Makarov pairing a real run for their money. While both Bykov and Khomutov were great penalty killers I have always felt as if Bykov was the more important player on that great pairing. Bykovs ice time finishes really were very impressive and watching him play it is very easy to understand why.

Bykov was such a clever and hard working player which in combination with his great skating made him an excellent player defensively on the penalty kill. Additionally my impression is that Bykov was one of the greatest Soviets when it comes to faceoffs as well. And while Khomutov was the one of the two who shined more when it comes to playing keep-away with the puck Bykov also mastered that skill. He also had a knack for scoring shorthanded goals after mistakes from the defencemen during the build-up of a powerplay rush.



Truly great shorthanded shift from Bykov and Khomutov against Canada at the 1987 Canada Cup. First Bykov makes a strong defensive play, then some very impressive puck possession before Bykov makes another strong defensive play.



Really great shorthanded shift from Bykov and Khomutov against New York Islanders at the 88/89 Super Series. First Bykov scores on a breakaway. Then he makes a really strong play and gives Khomutov a breakaway as well.



Another very strong shorthanded shift from Bykov and Khomutov against New York Islanders at the 88/89 Super Series.

 

[Batis]

4. Andrey Khomutov

Ice time finishes: 2nd at the 1990 WHC, 3rd at the 1985 WHC, 3rd at the 85/86 Super Series, 3rd at the 1986 WHC, Tied for 3rd at the 1987 Canada Cup, 3rd at the 88/89 Super Series, 3rd at the 1989 WHC, 4th at the 1987 WHC, Tied for 4th at the 1988 WOG, 5th at the 1987 Rendezvous

Overall stats: 2 goals forward and 7 goals against over 91 min, 1 sec

Andrey Khomutov was one of the greatest Soviet stickhandlers of all time and he often used this ability to keep puck away from the powerplay units. Khomutov was also a tireless forechecker and very good at stealing the puck from the opponents as you can see a great example of in the third video of the Bykov post above. While I view Bykov as the leading player Khomutov was definitely also a very important part of one of the greatest penalty killing forward pairings in Soviet hockey history. The Bykov-Khomutov pairing also showed that they were very able to kill penalties against powerplay units which had many of the greatest players of all time.



Some incredible stickhandling from Khomutov against USA at the 1985 WHC.



Another great stickhandling exhibition from Khomutov against Finland at 1986 WHC.



Strong shift from the Bykov-Khomutov pairing against Czechoslovakia at the 1987 WHC where Khomutov shows his whole repertoire of the abilities which made him a strong penalty killer (forechecking, puck stealing and puck possession)

 

[Batis]

5. Sergey Svetlov

Ice time finishes: 2nd at the 1986 WHC, Tied for 3rd at the 1987 Rendezvous, 3rd at the 1987 WHC, 4th at the 1984 Canada Cup, Tied for 4th at the 1988 WOG, 5th at the 1985 WHC, 6th at the 1987 Canada Cup

Overall stats: 2 goals forward and 5 goals against over 43 min, 34 sec

Sergey Svetlov and Anatoly Semenov formed a strong forward pairing who just like the Krutov-Makarov and Bykov-Khomutov pairings built much of their penalty killing on puck possession. Svetlov was clearly the leading player on that pairing and his speed made him a constant threat for the powerplay units to keep track of. When Svetlov was on the ice you had to be very careful with pinching as a defenceman because once he took off there was not much hope of catching him without having to take a penalty yourself.



Brilliant moves and shorthanded assist from Svetlov against Czechoslovakia at the 1987 WHC.



During this shift Svetlov both wins the puck to clear the zone and then scores a shorthanded goal on a rocket of a shot against Canada at the 1987 Canada Cup.



Here Svetlov shows some of his speed when he intercepts a pass from Langway and forces a penalty against USA at the 1984 Canada Cup.

 

[VMBM]

I really feel like many of Krutovs abilities as a hockey player often seems to get severely underrated. Like his skating, stickhandling and passing for example. These qualities were along with his strenght what made him such a great puck possession player. But Krutov was also very good at defending in his own zone as he for example was great on the 3 on 5.

Some people just can't get over his failed NHL career and quick drop from elite level in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Also, his somewhat overemphasized image as a "Tank" (power foward) has often overshadowed his other skills.

But it's their loss.

 

[Canadiens1958]

Being shorthanded is obviously never "advantageous", but if you managed to score more SH goals than you concede goals on the PK you clearly end up with a positive ratio. Regardless whether you concede 0 goals and score 1 or you concede 8 and score 9, the result is a positive ratio of +1.



Exactly. Teams don't have positive/winning ratios while they're shorthanded. Whether it's 1-0 or 9-8: it doesn't happen in competitive hockey... And yet, not having a positive/winning ratio was what you used as an argument against the Soviet PK in post #71.



Sure, if you are sporting enough to clarify for us whether your stance has changed since that post. And if so, why and how it has changed.



This analogy doesn't work. In terms of value for the team: A goal is a goal, whether it's an ES goal or a PP goal or a SH goal. SH goals do not equal broken dishes that have been glued together. But even if they were somehow inferior or less valueable than other goals, your analogy would only work if a team started by allowing goals on the PP ("dishes broken") and then reacting with SH goals ("glued together"). If the team starts with scoring SH goals before conceding any PP goals, then the "broken" analogy fails even when you accepted the (faulty) premise of whole dishes vs broken dishes.

An actual analogy would work like this: At the beginning every game is tied 0-0. Each team has one dish: the initial clean sheet. You concede a goal, the dish is broken and gone. You score a goal, you add a new dish. There are no glued-together dishes as opposed to whole ones. There are just dishes and each dish that counts for either team is as "whole" and valuable as the others.



The question remains why Team Canada 1974 out of all teams should be the ultimate yardstick for the Soviet PK over all the other and much superior editions of Team Canada. That looks like cherry picking to me.

We simply have different hockey experiences and realities. Mine is centered around defence and winning yours seems to be about some abstraction of looking good offensively while losing. You are welcome to it.

Best highlited by the bolded. Effectively I am being accused of cherry-picking. Total nonsense. All that I am suggesting is that the measure of any hockey quality starts at its lowest or weakest point and measures growth from that point to its highest.

Effectively we have identified, without contradiction, the lowest point in the Soviet PK performance. Why this makes you uncomfortable remains a mystery that I do not wish to explore. Fact remains that the Soviet PK improved after this performance since the coaches and braintrust looked at the performance, breaking down the weaknesses against all possible combinations they faced and produced a much better Soviet PK.

 

[Theokritos]

Mine is centered around defence and winning yours seems to be about some abstraction of looking good offensively while losing. You are welcome to it.

A ratio of -2 is never winning. If 3-5 constitutes "looking good offensively while losing" then 0-2 constitutes "feeling better while losing". Neither constitutes "winning" though and of course, scoring a winning ratio is not something realistic on the PK anyway. Keeping the negative ratio as small as possible is what it's about. Being -2 over the course of 22 PP opportunitites for Team Canada is as good as it gets.

Best highlited by the bolded. Effectively I am being accused of cherry-picking. Total nonsense. All that I am suggesting is that the measure of any hockey quality starts at its lowest or weakest point and measures growth from that point to its highest.

Effectively we have identified, without contradiction, the lowest point in the Soviet PK performance. Why this makes you uncomfortable remains a mystery that I do not wish to explore.

Fact remains that the Soviet PK improved after this performance since the coaches and braintrust looked at the performance, breaking down the weaknesses against all possible combinations they faced and produced a much better Soviet PK.

Maybe you should consider how you have expressed yourself earlier in this thread. You were initially referring to "the Soviet PK skills" (post #58) and "Soviet PKs" (#58) in general. The issue is not that you have identified the lowest point, it's that you have acted as if the lowest point was the general level.

 

[Canadiens1958]

A ratio of -2 is never winning. If 3-5 constitutes "looking good offensively while losing" then 0-2 constitutes "feeling better while losing". Neither constitutes "winning" though and of course, scoring a winning ratio is not something realistic on the PK anyway. Keeping the negative ratio as small as possible is what it's aineybout. Being -2 over the course of 22 PP opportunitites for Team Canada is as good as it gets.



Maybe you should consider how you have expressed yourself earlier in this thread. You were initially referring to "the Soviet PK skills" (post #58) and "Soviet PKs" (#58) in general. The issue is not that you have identified the lowest point, it's that you have acted as if the lowest point was the general level.

Losing always feels the same, there is never a better.

Perhaps you should reviewed the time line from 1974, thru post #58:

http://hfboards.mandatory.com/posts/140647839/

At the time Balderis was playing the Soviet PK had improved compared to 1974 but was not at the Canadiens level especially with Bob Gainey. Remember Coach Tikhonov had great words for Bob Gainey.

Moving forward to 1987 and new Soviet PK skaters headed by Makarov and Krutov.
Gave up 5 PP goals in 22 attempts, mitigated by 3 PK goals while overall losing 2-3 goal leads in games against Canada the majority of the time. Cannot unscore the 5 PP goals against or make them go away like the -2 claim attempts.

So the only progress defensively is cosmetic. The weaknesses evident in the 1970s have not been corrected rather after a slight improvement have been replaced by offensive, feel better,strengths - PK goals. Different make-up in a cosmetic attempt to hide the ugly side of Soviet overall defensive weaknesses including the PK.

 

[Batis]

Here comes the second half of the 80's list which concludes the posting of my ranking lists.

6. Alexander Skvortsov

Ice time finishes: 2nd at the 1983 WHC, 3rd at the 82/83 Super Series, 3rd at the 1984 WOG, 5th at the 1980 WOG, 5th at the 1984 Canada Cup, 7th at the 1979 Challenge Cup

Overall stats: 1 goal forward and 3 goals against over 28 min, 37 sec

Alexander Skvortsov may very well be one of the most energetic players that I have ever seen and he was very strong on both the forecheck and the backcheck. His very hard work and strong skating made him a valuable penalty killer. In the early 80's Skvortsov formed a strong pairing with Zhluktov. Then Skvortsov also had two successful tournaments paired with Kovin (1984 WOG) and Varnakov (1984 Canada Cup).



Nice shorthanded goal from Skvortsov showing his strong skating against Canada at the 1984 Olympics.



Strong shorthanded shift from Skvortsov where you can see some of his instensive forechecking against Canada at the 1984 Canada Cup.



Even if Canada creates some good chances during this shift Skvortsov also makes a strong play and creates a shorthanded chance for the Soviets as well at the 1981 Canada Cup.

 

[Batis]

7. Irek Gimaev

Ice time finishes: 2nd at the 1982 WHC, 4th at the 1983 WHC, Tied for 5th at the 1985 WHC, 6th at the 85/86 Super Series, 6th at the 1981 Canada Cup, 6th at the 1984 Canada Cup

Overall stats: 0 goals forward and 0 goals against over 24 min, 51 sec

Irek Gimaev was definitely one of the most versatile penalty killers of the Soviet Union considering that he could play the forward and the defenceman positions equally well. He was a very hard worker with a strong defensive game and about as reliable a player as they come. Gimaev had his most successful tournaments playing on a pairing with Zhluktov.



Great performance from Gimaev against Czechoslovakia at the 1981 Canada Cup. Intercepts a pass and draws a penalty.



Gimaev on a 3 on 5 shift against Sweden at the 1984 Canada Cup.



Strong shorthanded shift from Gimaev and Zhluktov against Canada at the 1982 WHC. (already posted in the Zhluktov post)

 

[Batis]

8. Anatoly Semenov

Ice time finishes: 3rd at the 1984 Canada Cup, 5th at the 1987 Canada Cup, 6th at the 1987 WHC, 6th at the 1988 WOG, 7th at the 1987 Rendezvous

Overall stats: 2 goals forward and 5 goals against over 32 min, 43 sec

As mentioned earlier Anatoly Semenov and Sergey Svetlov formed a very strong penalty killing pairing in the mid/late 80's. Their styles really complemented each others very well with Svetlovs amazing speed and Semenovs cerebral approach to the game. Semenov was also a hard worker who often managed to win board battles while shorthanded.



Truly great shorthanded shift from Svetlov and Semenov (plus Fetisov and Kasatonov) against Canada at the 1987 Canada Cup. Some very impressive puck possession.



Strong shift from Semenov against USA at the 1984 Canada Cup.



Hard working shorthanded shift from Semenov against Sweden at the 1987 Canada Cup.

 

[Batis]

9. Sergey Shepelev

Ice time finishes: Tied for 2nd at the 1981 Canada Cup, Tied for 4th at the 82/83 Super Series, 8th at the 1984 Canada Cup, Tied for 8th at the 1983 WHC

Overall stats: 0 goals forward and 0 goals against over 17 min, 29 sec

Sergey Shepelev and Victor Shalimov formed a very strong pairing in the early 80's. While Shalimov clearly was the stronger player on that pairing Shepelev was also a key contributor. Just like as a player Shepelevs peak as a penalty killer came at the 1981 Canada Cup where he had a very strong showing on the penalty kill.



Strong shorthanded shift from Shepelev and Shalimov against Canada at the 1981 Canada Cup.



Strong shorthanded shift from Shepelev and Shalimov against Minnesota North Stars at the 82/83 Super Series. Strong play from Shepelev when he steals the puck and clears the zone.



Shepelev clear the zone on a couple of occasions against USA at the 1981 Canada Cup.

 

[Batis]

10. Igor Larionov

Ice time finishes: 4th at the 88/89 Super Series, 5th at the 1983 WHC, 5th at the 1984 WOG, 6th at the 82/83 Super Series, 8th at the 1987 Canada Cup

Overall stats: 1 goal forward and 5 goals against over 31 min, 56 sec

Even if Igor Larionov clearly was the least talented penalty killer on the KLM-line he was still a strong penalty killer himself. Larionovs combination of great passing and strong positioning was in my opinion his strongest abilities on the penalty kill. Not that surprisingly Larionov spent most of his time penalty killing with either Makarov or Krutov



Great puck possession on this shorthanded shift from Larionov, Makarov, Fetisov and Konstantinov against Hartford Whalers at the 88/89 Super Series.



Strong shorthanded shift from Larionov against Philadelphia Flyers at the 82/83 Super Series.



Strong shift from Larionov and Krutov against Quebec Nordiques at the 82/83 Super Series.

 

[Batis]

Some additional comments: Like I mentioned before the 70's generation was easier to rank at the top of the list than the 60's generation. The 80's generation was by far the easiest to rank though since the order of the first five players (Makarov, Krutov, Bykov, Khomutov and Svetlov) was pretty clear in my opinion. It was only at the end of the list that it was far harder to rank the players and again some of the players who did not make the cut (Tyumenev, Vasiliev) compared rather favourably to the last players who made the cut (Semenov, Shepelev, Larionov) even if I think that the second group has a clear but small edge.

Makarov
Krutov
Bykov
Khomutov
Svetlov
Skvortsov/Gimaev
Semenov/Shepelev/Larionov
Tyumenev/Vasiliev

This is roughly how I view this generation of Soviet penalty killers. Much of the 80's was more so than any other era dominated by two great penalty killing pairings (Krutov-Makarov, Bykov-Khomutov) which also is reflected in this ranking. The only other forward who in my opinion has a case for making the top 4 of this era is Sergey Svetlov if we give him much credit for having such strong ice time finishes without playing on one of those all-time great penalty killing pairings. The only one I could see him overtake in the top 4 is Andrey Khomutov though. While I personally have Khomutov ahead of Svetlov a case can definitely be made for Svetlov. Then Skvortsov and Gimaev who both spent much time with Zhluktov in the early 80's come right behind Svetlov with a small but clear margin. Then the Semenov, Shepelev and Larionov group comes with Tyumenev and Vasiliev relatively close behind them. Another player worthy of a mention is Vladimir Kovin although it is pretty difficult to decide which generation he belongs to. Still Kovin was not quite good enough to make neither the 70's nor the 80's list in my opinion even if he was a strong penalty killer for a long time.

 

[Batis]

So the only progress defensively is cosmetic. The weaknesses evident in the 1970s have not been corrected rather after a slight improvement have been replaced by offensive, feel better,strengths - PK goals. Different make-up in a cosmetic attempt to hide the ugly side of Soviet overall defensive weaknesses including the PK.

Regarding these defensive weaknesses of the Soviets it is interesting that Canada/NHL let in clearly more powerplay goals against the Soviets than the Soviets did against Canada/NHL in best-on-best competition between the 1972 Summit Series and the 1987 Canada Cup. Seems like Canada also could have needed some cosmetic attempts to hide the ugly side of their own defensive weaknesses. Before someone jumps down my throat about it I want to point out that this last comment was obviously only sarcastic. However I do think that a very good case can be made for that the Soviet penalty kill actually outperformed the Canadian/NHL penalty kill over a rather large sample of games during the 1972-1987 time frame. This does not mean that the top Soviet penalty killers were superior to the top Canadian penalty killers of that time frame but it is in my opinion a good indication of that the top Soviet penalty killers definitely belonged among the best penalty killers in the world at the time.

Soviets versus Canada/NHL (Summit Series 1972, Canada Cup 1976, Challenge Cup 1979, Canada Cup 1981, Canada Cup 1984, Rendezvous 1987, Canada Cup 1987)
USSR: 8 shorthanded goals forward, 14 powerplay goals against, goal differential -6
Canada/NHL: 1 shorthanded goal forward, 19 powerplay goals against, goal differential -18

And here is the tournament by tournament breakdown.

Summit Series 1972
USSR: 3 shorthanded goals forward, 2 powerplay goals against, goal differential +1
Canada: 1 shorthanded goal forward, 7 powerplay goals against, goal differential -6

Canada Cup 1976 (1 USSR-Canada game)
USSR: 0 shorthanded goals forward, 1 powerplay goal against, goal differential -1
Canada: 0 shorthanded goals forward, 0 powerplay goals against, goal differential 0

Challenge Cup 1979
USSR: 1 shorthanded goals forward, 2 powerplay goals against, goal differential -1
NHL: 0 shorthanded goals forward, 3 powerplay goals against, goal differential -3

Canada Cup 1981 (2 USSR-Canada games)
USSR: 1 shorthanded goal forward, 1 powerplay goals against, goal differential 0
Canada: 0 shorthanded goals forward, 3 powerplay goals against, goal differential -3

Canada Cup 1984 (2 USSR-Canada games)
USSR: 0 shorthanded goals forward, 1 powerplay goal against, goal differential -1
Canada: 0 shorthanded goals forward, 2 powerplay goals against, goal differential -2

Rendezvous 1987
USSR: 0 shorthanded goals forward, 2 powerplay goals against, goal differential -2
NHL: 0 shorthanded goals forward, 1 powerplay goal against, goal differential -1

Canada Cup 1987 (4 USSR-Canada games)
USSR: 3 shorthanded goals forward, 5 powerplay goals against, goal differential -2
Canada: 0 shorthanded goals forward, 3 powerplay goals against, goal differential -3

 

[Theokritos]

Good job with this thread.