Yes, yes, of course I never know what I am talking about. I never do a bit of research, right?
One more favor, since you're in an obliging mood. Can you give me the Exec Summary version? I have to read all these posts, so the less time they take, the better.
As to the point above, just because we can look at the same set of information and come to different conclusions doesn't mean you don't do research, nor that I would accuse of you of not knowing what you're talking about. If I wanted to tell you that, I have your email address, right? And a phone number. And where you work. I'm surprised that you'd get melodramatic over our friendly little barbs.
http://docs.bmcgroup.com/phoenixcoyotes/docs/azb_2-09-bk-9488_150.pdf
As I have previously noted, the NHL did make advances to the team in respect of amounts to which the team was to be eventually entitled. Some $31.4M, in fact, although the amount at the time of petition was $23.6M (as some of the advances had already been credited back due to the distribution of NHL TV monies in late 2008). These advances were not, however, the loans which the NHL eventually recouped as a creditor under the bankruptcy. [/quote]
Okay. The NHL loaned him$31.4 MM, and we deducted the team's share of central funds owed to them, leaving $13.4 MM. Why didn't you say so?
At the time of petition, the amount of third party indebtedness (to SOF Investments) was $79.6M (para 32 of the linked document).
Agreed.
At the time of petition, the amount borrowed from the NHL (after the team had exhausted all of its 2008-09 advances) was $13.4M.
$79.6M + $13.4M = $93M.
This was in May 2009, correct? Do you know what the offer from Reinsdorf was when Bettman was headed to see Moyes in May of 2009 to present it?
Had he accepted the JR offer, those are the balances of indebtedness he would have been required to satisfy. Instead, the interest on SOF accumulated for 6 more months (~$1M more) and the indebtedness to the NHL grew to $36.3M.
This is where you lose me again (coupled to knowing what JR was offering in May 2009). The $1 MM is rather immaterial to this part of the discussion. How did the indebtedness to the NHL go from $13.4MM to $36.3MM?
Does it include the $15 MM personal guarantee, which of course the NHL is suing to gain per the last report over a year ago, but we'll wait for CF.
We certainly do not know for sure, but you should be made aware that Moyes' cooperation has been limited. The limit has been to facilitate NHL and COG transactions which suit his purpose of limiting his exposure (i.e., getting a new local deal with MH), but rest assured that he has been fighting hammer and tong with the parties on any and all other issues. One need only review the record to identify numerous fierce spats between the parties since the team was sold.
That's the thing about money. He did leave himself exposed, but did he have something to leverage to reduce that exposure, in the end nullifying the loss he should have suffered?
Regarding Gretzky, the bankruptcy record, particuarly the deposition transcripts, are replete with evidence that the Gretzky contracts were with Moyes personally. Even Rodier fessed up to it in one of his emails to Moyes' counsel.
Shouldn't Gretzky be the one suing Moyes then? Honestly, does the NHL have any
standing since their case has been over the Coyotes ownership and their own personal guarantee with Moyes?
That is not a feasible way of looking at it. If he had taken JR's deal (remember, that is the subject), he would not have undertaken those losses either.
Had you not snipped my post where you had, it goes on to say exactly that, hence my query as to why he'd take as big a gamble as he did. When logic fails to explain motivation, look to emotion. As any good divorce attorney might tell you.
he was not free and clear from any of COG's claims for terminating the lease, either. As an aside, the COG also sued him personally, IIRC.
The lease does fall fully under the BK court's jurisdiction however. COG is free to file a claim, iirc, but they'll have to fight over the pennies that are left after the secured creditors are paid out.
Bankruptcy laws will protect creditors, but they don't act so as to invalidate personal guarantees of principals of a bankrupt company. In order to stop them, the personal guarantor must himself go bankrupt. Personal guarantees are what lenders require in order to prevent being exposed if the borrower itself goes bankrupt.
The NHL already has personal guarantees in place. They may have a hard time increasing the amount required, which the case amply highlights.