The TSN Solution

[wint]

Both sides go into the arbitration hearing know that it's one or the other. If you can't handle that, then settle before the hearing.

But if the team brings the player into arbitration (i.e. the player did NOT want arbitration), he can't really be forced to sign a contract, can he?

In the old CBA, only players could opt for arbitration. However, because the teams did not choose to go, they had the option of simply letting the player go if they did not like the size of the award. I am wondering what corresponding right the player would have if he does not like the size of the award he is granted in an arbitration process originated by the team.

This comes into play in the following example...say Martin Havlat plays through injuries next year and has his ice time decreased because Hossa, Alfredsson, and now Bondra are above him on the depth chart. As a result, he has a tough 45-point year (as compared to his average of 64 the last 2 years). His owner qualifies him at 75% of his current salary and takes him to arbitration. If Havlat doesn't agree with the award, can he really be forced to sign a contract that he believes underpays him? If not, what happens?

 

[thinkwild]

I would think if Havlat holds out, and his salary reduced to 75% of its value was about $1.6mil after the bad arbitration for him, he would be a ripe target for an rfa offer sheet at $2.1mil. Which is what, a first and second rounder or something? Cant see him lasting long on the shelf at that price.

If it was Bonk we took to arbitration, qualifying him at $2.7 instead of $3.5, and he held out, would 2 first rounders be too steep for LA or MTL to offer? Probably. Maybe if the compensation was a bit lower it could work.

It does seem wrong to use the injuries on Havlat that way. But otherwise, it doesnt strike me as outlandishly unfair or lacking in rights for the player so far. But I cant imagine all the situations it would be used for yet.

 

[BAdvocate]

the TSN solution is ok, but the 40 million luxery tax will not work at all, esp. with only a 100% tax after anything above the 40 million mark

if the Rangers spend 60 million and pay another 20 miilion it will mean nothing, if small market teams spend 30 million, lets say the 12 teams that are below 40 million collect some of that 20 million....thats less than 2 million per team which would raise there payrolls very little

What about the other teams above the luxury tax? 18 of 30 teams had salary payrolls above the $40M mark last year. I'd be willing to bet the avg. amount the 18 teams are over is at least $5M. That would mean $90M to split between 12 teams equaling about $8M per team (assuming all have payrolls of at least $30M, otherwise each team will get more).

That said, a luxury tax of this sort would result in more teams staying at or below the threshold, as well as more with payrolls of at least $30M. In any event even if you change the avg payout to $4M, that's 10% of your total payroll max, which I would say will make a difference.

Bottom line, IMO if a tax like this was implemented, I believe it would discourage the reckless spending of the owners, and as an added benefit (to fans of franchises with cheap owners), it is more likely most teams would be spending at least $30M on their teams in order to benefit from the tax. Ultimately, a more even playing field for all teams in terms of payrolls with a few exceptions who can afford the salary & tax. Key here is that there will only be a few exceptions, not the 18 of 30 as exists in todays NHL. Just my opinion though.

 

[Motown Beatdown]

What about the other teams above the luxury tax? 18 of 30 teams had salary payrolls above the $40M mark last year. I'd be willing to bet the avg. amount the 18 teams are over is at least $5M. That would mean $90M to split between 12 teams equaling about $8M per team (assuming all have payrolls of at least $30M, otherwise each team will get more).

I actually figured it out a few weeks ago. From the site i used 15 teams had payroll over 40 million. If there was a dollar for dollar penalty those 15 teams would have put in 240 million dollar into the luxury tax.

I'll try to find the post....

 

[dawgbone]

I would think if Havlat holds out, and his salary reduced to 75% of its value was about $1.6mil after the bad arbitration for him, he would be a ripe target for an rfa offer sheet at $2.1mil. Which is what, a first and second rounder or something? Cant see him lasting long on the shelf at that price.

I'm not too sure how it's any different... If Havlat doesn't agree to his Q.O. of 100%, and decides to test the RFA waters, is $2.1mil and the compensation too much for Havlat. I don't see the difference here.

I think the players would be forced to take an arbitration-awarded contract. But put in limits. For example a player can only choose to go to arbitration twice in his career, and he can only be taken to arbitration twice in his career (the numbers can be altered). This would allow his salary to be corrected high or low, based on performance, 4 times.

However, my conclusion is that the reason for "cost certainty" mantra from the owners is to "guarantee" that teams will *at least* break even. Reading that econ prof on TSN a few weeks ago about salary caps does not endear me to them, even so.

A system that will allow the worst business practices to be profitable should not be put in place. One that will allow adequate business practices to *break even* and good business practices to *make a profit* would encourage fiduciary responsibility, which should allow for long term stable economic existence of the league.

Not necessarily. The idea of cost certainty is to allow teams a realistic chance of breaking even. You aren't going to draw fans and make money if your team is terrible and you are always losing your best players... so instead of that, teams lose money because they pay salaries they can't afford in hopes that the team has some success.

Let's use two examples... ones that I am very familiar with. Both teams have payrolls in the lower half of the league, and both are in similar financial situations.

Team A: has a $32mil payroll, sellsout the building, and in order to make a profit they need to have 3 home playoff dates (the 3rd home playoff date generates $1mil in profits).

Team B: has a $36mil payroll, fills the building to about 85% capacity (sellsout when the team is rocking), and with 3 home playoff dates, they still lose $3mil.

Neither team pays insane amounts of money, both are relatively within their means to be competetive, both are continually making player decisions every year that involve their top players (whether to keep them or get rid of them).

These are the teams that benefit. Ones that stay within their means, and have good hockey minds at the helm. The team that has a $46mil payroll and loses $10mil won't be helped at all. Teams that are losing $10 mil or more right now won't be profitable, or break even. The teams that are losing a couple of mil, or are breaking even, will be the ones who benefit.

Stupid business decisions will still be punished with losses.

 

[wint]

I would think if Havlat holds out, and his salary reduced to 75% of its value was about $1.6mil after the bad arbitration for him, he would be a ripe target for an rfa offer sheet at $2.1mil.

But that's the whole point...if he is forced to sign a contract for $1.6 million, no other team could sign him to an offer sheet because he is no longer an RFA. He already signed. There could be a situation where the 29 other teams in the NHL would gladly pay some player $3 million but the player gets forced into an arbitration process that in turn forces him to sign and play for half of that. The player's only way out is to pull a Yashin and refuse to honor his contract.

 

[PecaFan]

But if the team brings the player into arbitration (i.e. the player did NOT want arbitration), he can't really be forced to sign a contract, can he?

This comes into play in the following example...say Martin Havlat plays through injuries next year and has his ice time decreased because Hossa, Alfredsson, and now Bondra are above him on the depth chart. As a result, he has a tough 45-point year (as compared to his average of 64 the last 2 years). His owner qualifies him at 75% of his current salary and takes him to arbitration. If Havlat doesn't agree with the award, can he really be forced to sign a contract that he believes underpays him? If not, what happens?

Why not? That's the way it is with the GM's and owners right now. They get dragged into arbitration, and have to give contracts they don't want. Yes, there is the walkaway rule, but it's basically irrelevant, as only the worst of the worst awards are walked away from, 3 out of hundreds and hundreds.

For Havlat to lose that arbitration, he has to offer a salary that gets rejected as too high so they take the owner's offer, and make an unconvincing case that he deserves the higher amount. If he does both those things, yes absolutely, he should be forced to sign it. It's called living by the rules.

I also disagree with the word "underpaid". Does that mean that every time they chose the player's offer, he'd be "overpaid"? He'd be getting paid what an independent third party declared was fair.

If a player is injured and can no longer provide the services he used to, and his role on the team is no longer what it used to be, his salary should go down. There's an underlying assumption in your post that this is somehow unfair. Why?

 

[thinkwild]

But that's the whole point...if he is forced to sign a contract for $1.6 million, no other team could sign him to an offer sheet because he is no longer an RFA. He already signed. There could be a situation where the 29 other teams in the NHL would gladly pay some player $3 million but the player gets forced into an arbitration process that in turn forces him to sign and play for half of that. The player's only way out is to pull a Yashin and refuse to honor his contract.

I guess thats kinda what I was thinking. When Havlat "walks away" from the arbitration, he is again an unsigned RFA, so I'd try to make it so he can still field offer sheets while he's holding out. The team that took him to arbitration should still keep his rights though. It wouldnt take much to lure Havlat away. Perhaps say the team can only match offer sheets up to their qualifying offer, so the likliehood of an offer sheet increases. And in a case like this, it wouldnt really need an inflationary offer sheet to get him. IF offer sheets are not prohibitive, and he still doesnt receive one, then I guess he takes the paycut fairly?

Edit:Yes after I saw what I typed, I realized this does negate somewhat the teams advantage in taking him to arbitration. IT is a tough one. But I still think if you want to reduce a players salary, you should be willing to waive him, at least through a process that provides RFA compenation.

 

[Tom_Benjamin]

I don't mind the idea that the team can take a player to arbitration. The reason this was suggested by Brian Burke has nothing to do with cutting a salary when a guy has a bad year. It is really hard to imagine that scenario.

It is not useful to make up a pretend scenario with a player like Havlat. Marty is an outstanding young player who is going to get better and better. He will have good bad and great years over his career. His pay won't hop up and down. Under the old CBA it would rise steadily until he became a free agent at age 31.

Burke wants to do away with holdouts. That was one of the points he made when he negotiated the CBA. Holdouts were a real problem before this CBA and there should not be any hold outs. A holdout never pays for the player, but some player agents haven't figured it out yet. Arbitration produces a fair result when there is a dispute.

Burke has often said he is not afraid of arbitration. What he hated was a player who passed on arbitration as a process to resolve a dispute.

"A player who passes on arbitration is trying to raise the bar," Burke often said. "They are using the threat of a hold out because they want a deal that is more than merely fair. It isn't right. The CBA is designed to avoid hold outs."

(This was before the NHL was pedaling the myth that arbitration was inflationary.)

I think it is very likely that the owners could have had the right to binding arbitration, too, but they probably preferred to have the walkaway rights they did get. To me that would be a good tradeoff. If you give the employer to right to preclude a hold out by taking the player to arbitration, you can't also give the team the right to walk away from the arbitration result.

I don't think it is useful to mix a qualifying offer into a discussion of arbitration. That is a different issue and the size of the qualifying offer isn't really relevant in arbitration. The qualifying offer has been rejected before arbitration. This means the player has been qualified. That offer is withdrawn. At this point the employer can demand the player take a 50% cut if they want. Previous offers are specifically precluded as evidence in arbitration.

Tom

 

[me2]

I guess thats kinda what I was thinking. When Havlat "walks away" from the arbitration, he is again an unsigned RFA, so I'd try to make it so he can still field offer sheets while he's holding out. The team that took him to arbitration should still keep his rights though. It wouldnt take much to lure Havlat away. Perhaps say the team can only match offer sheets up to their qualifying offer, so the likliehood of an offer sheet increases. And in a case like this, it wouldnt really need an inflationary offer sheet to get him. IF offer sheets are not prohibitive, and he still doesnt receive one, then I guess he takes the paycut fairly?

Edit:Yes after I saw what I typed, I realized this does negate somewhat the teams advantage in taking him to arbitration. IT is a tough one. But I still think if you want to reduce a players salary, you should be willing to waive him, at least through a process that provides RFA compenation.

If the team walks away they lose compensation rights if that player signs with another team(right?). If the player walks away what is the player giving up?

 

[struckmatch]

According to Bob Mckenzie, the NHL and the NHLPA both hated the TSN Solution. The Players said it was too anti-player, and the NHL said it didn't guarantee cost-certainty.

http://www.tsn.ca/columnists/bob_mckenzie.asp

I just want to kidnap Bettman and Goodenow, and lock them in a room together.

 

[YellHockey*]

If the team walks away they lose compensation rights if that player signs with another team(right?).

Only if the player signs a contract with another team that is a certain percentage lower then their arbitration award.

 

[thinkwild]

.

 

[me2]

Only if the player signs a contract with another team that is a certain percentage lower then their arbitration award.

They have right to match any offer up to 80% but lose the right to compensation if they don't. Any offer equal to or over 80% they get no compensation and no right to match.

Either way they lose the right to compensation, which is designed to allow the player to find a new home.

12.6. Walk-Away Rights.


a) If a Club has elected to arbitrate a one year contract, and the award issued is for $550,000 or more per annum, then the Club may, within 72 hours after the award of the Arbitrator is issued (or if a Club has any other player still eligible for salary arbitration at that time and for whom a decision has not been rendered by an Arbitrator at that time, and the Club still has a walk-away right available to it in such League Year pursuant to paragraph (d) below, 72 hours after the award of the Arbitrator for such other player is issued), notify the player, the NHLPA and the NHL in writing that it does not intend to tender to the player a Player Contract based on the award as determined by the Arbitrator. Upon receipt of that notice, the player shall automatically be deemed to be an Unrestricted Free Agent, subject to the provisions of paragraphs (c) and (d) below.

b) If a Club has elected to arbitrate a two year contract and the award issued is for $550,000 or more per annum, then the Club may, within 72 hours after the award of the Arbitrator is issued (or, if a Club has any other player still eligible for salary arbitration at that time and for whom a decision has not been rendered by an Arbitrator at that time, and the Club still has a walk-away right available to it in such League Year pursuant to paragraph (d) below, 72 hours after the award of the Arbitrator for such other player is issued), notify the player, the NHLPA and the NHL in writing that it does not intend to tender to the player a two year Player Contract based on the award as determined by the Arbitrator. Upon receipt of that notice by either the player or the NHL, the player and the Club shall enter into a one year Player Contract providing for the Compensation set forth in the award and the player will automatically be deemed to be an Unrestricted Free Agent at the conclusion of that one year Player Contract subject to the provisions of paragraphs (c) and (d) below.

c) If a Club exercises its walk-away right, the following applies:

c i) If the player accepts an offer from a New Club in respect of that year of the contract which the Prior Club has walked-away from that is less than 80% of the award for such year, the Prior Club may, within seven (7) days after the date it receives the applicable Offer Sheet, elect to match the offer of the New Club and the Player and the Prior Club shall enter into a Player Contract on those terms and conditions; or

c ii)The player may (A) within seven (7) days after receipt of notice from the player's Prior Club that the Prior Club elects to walk-away from the arbitration award, in respect of the Prior Club's request for a one year contract, or (B) by July 15 of the League Year following the expiry of the first year of the award issued by the Arbitrator where the Club had requested a two-year contract, in either case by written notice to the Club, elect to enter into a Player Contract with the Club on the terms and conditions set forth in the Prior Club's Qualifying Offer. If such election is timely exercised, the Club must enter into such contract and, at the end of the term thereof, the Player shall be a free agent subject to the provisions of Article 10.

d) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) above, a Club may exercise the walk-away rights referred to therein not more than 3 times in any contiguous two League Years and in any event not more than twice in any League Year. If a Club exercises its walk-away right with respect to a two year award, the walk-away right shall be deemed to be exercised in the first year of the two year contract.

e) The dollar amount of $550,000 set forth in each of paragraphs (a) and (b) above, shall be increased on an annual basis at the same percentage rate of increase as the Average League Salary, with the commencement of the 1996/97 League Year being the first year such increase shall take effect. By way of example, if the Average League Salary on June 30, 1996 has increased by 10% from the Average League Salary on June 30, 1995, then the figure of $550,000 stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, shall be increased by 10% on June 30, 1996, and the ability of a Club to walk-away from an arbitration award rendered after June 30, 1996, shall be adjusted accordingly. For each League Year thereafter, a similar comparison and adjustment shall be made.

If players walk away from an arbitration decision under a club initiated arbitration (in a new CBA system) what is their penalty?

 

[me2]

I just want to kidnap Bettman and Goodenow, and lock them in a room together.

Send them to Iraq wearing shirts with "I'm an American" written across it in bold letters. Make them wander the streets in plain sight until they have sorted out a solution.

 

[thinkwild]

If players walk away from an arbitration decision under a club initiated arbitration (in a new CBA system) what is their penalty?

Well for one they dont get to play - with the paycut. What more penalty do you want to impose on them. Are you looking for a rule that says you should get a point a game forward anytime you lose a player? Even if its one you are trying to give a pay cut too?



Bob seems surprised that both the NHL and the PA didnt like his solution. If it was so well reasoned and researched, why did it not solve any of the problems they are currently fighting over and both sides hate it? Maybe his solution was fixing non-problems

 

[me2]

Well for one they dont get to play - with the paycut. What more penalty do you want to impose on them. Are you looking for a rule that says you should get a point a game forward anytime you lose a player? Even if its one you are trying to give a pay cut too?

Thats no penalty at all, just status quo. That would be the equivalent of the player taking the owner to arbitration winning, the owner walking away while the player is now an RFA just like he was before arbitration (not an effective UFA). Its the arbitration you have when are not having a arbitration. Nothing but a worthless waste of time for all involved.

Maybe the player should lose the right to negotiate with any other NHL teams. Team takes player to arbitration, player loses in arbitration (wanted $4m, got $2.5m), player walks away, player loses right to negotiate with any other NHL teams. So the team offers $2m instead, player can take it or play elsewhere indefinitely.

Bob seems surprised that both the NHL and the PA didnt like his solution. If it was so well reasoned and researched, why did it not solve any of the problems they are currently fighting over and both sides hate it? Maybe his solution was fixing non-problems

His solution is fine. Neither side is ready to show the slightest compromise yet. If either side admits they like it thats the ammo the other side will use against them.

I don't expect the NHL to make any major compromises until the impasse when they get to implement their $31m cap whether or not the players like it (and all the lawsuits start). The only they move is if the players make a good offer before January.

The NHLPA are playing chicken, betting the owners crack before January. For their sake they better hope the owners do because once the NHL officially calls off the season in January, they won't budge a mm and the NHLPA will be the ones staring down the barrell.

Once the season is gone the owners have got nothing left to lose and they have an impasse to wave at the players. They'll be out for blood and their cap offer might get stingier.

 

[thinkwild]

Once the season is gone the owners have got nothing left to lose and they have an impasse to wave at the players. They'll be out for blood and their cap offer might get stingier.

Then so be it. Blood they shall have. You seem to take for granted this magical impase will be approved b the courts. All the owners have to do is wait it out and then they get to impose their will. We'll see.

 

[wint]

If you give the employer to right to preclude a hold out by taking the player to arbitration, you can't also give the team the right to walk away from the arbitration result.

But the problem here has to do with one party's right to walk away from the arbitration award when the OTHER party initiates arbitration. Under the old CBA, the team has the right to walk away from a player-initiated arbitration award. What right does the player have in the TSN solution in the case of a team-initiated arbitration award?

If I understand you correctly, you propose that the owners' rights to walk away from an unfavorable award in a player-initiated arbitration hearing be eliminated. This is indeed a compromise, but it brings up another problem. Under the rules of the old CBA, each party agreed to the arbitrated contract at some point in the arbitration process (the player agrees to the eventual outcome by electing for arbitration; the owner agrees by electing to sign the player for the arbitrated amount instead of walking away from the award).

In your proposed situation, you subject one of the parties to compliance with the arbitration award without ever having agreed to anything (either the player is forced to sign a contract that has been arbitrated at the team's request, or the team is forced to sign a contract that has been arbitrated at the player's request). Is this really fair to either side?

 

[Tom_Benjamin]

In your proposed situation, you subject one of the parties to compliance with the arbitration award without ever having agreed to anything (either the player is forced to sign a contract that has been arbitrated at the team's request, or the team is forced to sign a contract that has been arbitrated at the player's request). Is this really fair to either side?

You raise some good points, but I think it's fair as long as it is negotiated into the CBA. I don't imagine the NHLPA is very excited about bargaining away the player's right to a hold out but there are only a few players who are really affected by it. If this was important to the owners the players would have to think very hard before toepedoing a season over it.

Nobody would have to file for arbitration. If the team and the player can't come to an agreement, it simply goes to binding arbitration. Maybe it should give the team the same walk away rights they have now and give the player the right to walk away from the award and sign a contract in Europe.

Tom

 

[Blane Youngblood]

But that's the whole point...if he is forced to sign a contract for $1.6 million, no other team could sign him to an offer sheet because he is no longer an RFA. He already signed. There could be a situation where the 29 other teams in the NHL would gladly pay some player $3 million but the player gets forced into an arbitration process that in turn forces him to sign and play for half of that. The player's only way out is to pull a Yashin and refuse to honor his contract.

Teams and players will get screwed on a regular basis. From reading it, I believe that's part of the point. The idea is, "Get a deal done yourselves or you could get f***ed." to both the player and owner.

 

[BLONG7]

According to Bob Mckenzie, the NHL and the NHLPA both hated the TSN Solution. The Players said it was too anti-player, and the NHL said it didn't guarantee cost-certainty.

http://www.tsn.ca/columnists/bob_mckenzie.asp

I just want to kidnap Bettman and Goodenow, and lock them in a room together.

Neither liked it...big surprise These two guys are not going to be able to get a deal done... neither wants to flinch at all, very sad for the PA and the owners, but mostly the fans! The TSN solution wasn't meant to be the end all be all, it was suppose to give these guys an idea on how to compromise on the 6 sticking points, Gary and Knob just don't get it!

 

[Brent Burns Beard]

If players walk away from an arbitration decision under a club initiated arbitration (in a new CBA system) what is their penalty?

hmmm .... seems obvious ... their penalty is they dont have an NHL contract.

dr

 

[Gord Miller]

Just to be clear, the TSN solution eliminates walkaway rights for teams. The arbitrator's decision is binding.

 

[Kickabrat]

Neither liked it...big surprise These two guys are not going to be able to get a deal done... neither wants to flinch at all, very sad for the PA and the owners, but mostly the fans! The TSN solution wasn't meant to be the end all be all, it was suppose to give these guys an idea on how to compromise on the 6 sticking points, Gary and Knob just don't get it!

These meglomaniacs could care less. They have to know that the only solution to this mess is a compromise. Yet that word is not in their vocabulary. It's all or nothing. I don't think the owners want a negotiated solution, or they would be willing to discuss a luxury tax. Their real intention is to break the union.

IMO their plan is to declare an impasse, impose new work rules and hope that a sufficient number of players jump ship. If not, they will use replacement players willing to play by their rules and eventually force the NHLPA's hand. Why else have they rejected every single suggestion made, most of which could form the framework of an agreement?